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Abstract

Conventionally, the English School (ES) of International Relations often focus on the role of Great Powers in managing international conflicts, and expect the successful maintenance of international order. Although more recent works shifted the focus from international society to regional society, such works remain within realm of the distinctiveness of regional society from different parts of the world. Yet again, they have been analysed through the working institutions of international society or else debunking such institutions in this and that regions. However, there is still a lacuna in conceptualising regional powers in the ES. This working-paper intends to fill this gap by arguing that regional powers can be conceptualised within the ES. Contemporary issues of the Asia-Pacific region will be used to illustrate the point.

Keywords: regional powers, regional society, international society, English school, Asia-Pacific region

1. Introduction

Conventionally, the English School (ES) of International Relations often focus on the role of Great Powers in managing international conflicts, and expect the successful maintenance of international order. Although more recent works shifted the focus from international society to regional society, such works remain within realm of the distinctiveness of regional society from different parts of the world. Yet again, they have been analysed through the working institutions of international society or else debunking such institutions in this and that regions. However, there is still a lacuna in conceptualising regional powers in the ES. This working-paper intends to fill this gap by arguing that regional powers can be conceptualised through drawing the relations of Nolte's conceptualisation of regional powers and Bull's proposal of the elements of Great Powers Management in international society. In doing so, contemporary issues of the Asia-Pacific region will be used to substantiate the argument. The structure of this working paper is divided into four parts. The first part serves as a literature review so as to point out a lack of discussion on regional powers in the ES. The second part attempts to analyse reasons behind the ES bereft of regional powers. The third part examines the definition of regional powers and introduces Nolte's notion of regional powers. Lastly, the fourth part will analysed contemporary issues of the Asia-Pacific region through regional powers, showing that regional powers are able to order when skirmishes occur as well as contributing to order at the global level.

A lack of Regional Powers in the English School (ES) of International Relations Institutions of international society is one of the fundamental concepts of the ES. In viewing the society of states through the primary and secondary institutions of international society, the existing literature of regional international society has been devoted to understanding international relations through the analysis of the institutions of international society.

The question of the complexities in the literature on the entrance of international society and the reconsideration of the ES institutions in relations to different regions, have been one of the fundamental themes of the ES scholars. Suzuki's emphasis on the Japanese entry to international society and the reconsideration of war as an institution, are a case in point. Suzuki (2005,149) argue that the perception of Japanese leaders of European International Society

had never been about stability and order but of insecurity. This is understandable if the picture of Japan in relations to international society has been about the coercive notion which Japan was under so as to be forced into the society (Suzuki, 2005:149). Any resistance from Japan often met with violent reaction, and the Japanese were reminded of how powerful European states were and Japanese's helplessness to react to foreign threat. Japan was forced into accepting unequal treaties and deprived of its sovereign prerogatives.

Japanese understanding of the institution of war does not take the term literally in the sense of classical ES (Suzuki, 2005:150). It does not see peace as a norm or war as violation or exception. It understands war as a necessary evil and peace is "logically prior to war" (Suzuki, 2005:150). War is important due to its being the only tool of justice when political superior is absent (Suzuki, 2005:150) whereas, similarly, Schoenberg (2012:148) emphasises on the institutions of international society, particularly the new principles of legitimacy which appears to constitute communities of loyalty and organisation of authority going beyond the officially established states. Schoenberg does not regard the EU and the American states-union as newly emerged concept or new states in making, an example has been put forward in order to reveal that they are instead divisible sovereignty or plural authorities (Schoenberg, 2012:148). He believes that regional international society should not be limited to what is commonly held as type of developments (Schoenberg, 2012:148). Changes are obvious in these events. However, this does not indicate that subtle changes never happen in between them (Schoenberg, 2012:148).

With regards to illuminating the distinctiveness of regional society from different parts of the world, Buzan and Zhang (2014) pose a question of what degree has East Asian regional international society emerged. They examine the present comparative international societies (Buzan and Zhang, 2014:4). The analysis tends to fill the gap which was lost when the narrative of the expansion of Western international society preoccupies the classical ES. In examining East Asian international society through the primary institutions, they highlight regional differentiation from global level, a type of form, and to what degree (Buzan and Zhang, 2014:5). In Southeast Asia, Narine (2006:200) attempts to tackle the question of ASEAN's durability and its members' conviction to the organization. The focal point of his article is on ASEAN's changes and maintenance during 1967-97, particularly touching upon the

transformation which ASEAN has gone through in the post-economic crisis period. The relationship between constructivist theory and the ES of IR is explored. Narine applies the ES lens to the understanding of ASEAN. He asserts that although there are similarities between the ES and constructivism, the ES offers better explanation in IR (Narine, 2006:200). The analysis provides the explication of ASEAN's durability which makes more sense than the constructivist approach. Narine (2006:200) argues that ASEAN pays particular attention to the importance of international law with the aim of protecting the most sacred element of the international society which is sovereignty. The strong adherence of sovereignty has resulted in individual ASEAN states to accept policies which are anomalous to values embedded in ASEAN (Narine, 2006:200). The ES addresses these contradictory differences by understanding that wants from various institutions render conflict in the organisation (Narine, 2006:200).

Another methodological tenet of regional society in the existing literature is the emphasis on the shift from the expansion of European International Society to new forms of standard of civilisations. Russia's position in international society is a case in point. A careful analysis of how Russia operated, especially in the post-Crimean War, showed that Russia was not inside European International Society but instead were left in a peripheral tie and was not regarded as conforming to European standard of civilisation (Buranelli, 2014:835). Buranelli (2014:835) reveals three important observations. First, he demonstrates a negligent fact in the commonly held view of the expansion of European international society, arguing that the standard of civilisation also exists within the West itself rather than merely between the West and the rest (Buranelli, 2014:835). His analysis basically debunks the narrative of the expansion of European International Society (Buranelli, 2014:835). Instead of seeing Russia as a Great Power in 19th century, Buranelli (2014:835) analyses Russia in civilisational ones. Lastly, Buranelli (2014:835) captures what the classical English school thinkers did not touch upon, that is thinking about how the expansion is seen and framed by others rather than upholding what the expansion is thought to be for the expander. A new form of standard of civilisation is more prominently shown in Stivachtis's writings (cite his works). Stivachtis (2014:338) mainly argues that the European Union's policies enhance an international and world order which reflects the values and interests of the EU. The EU has, Sivachtis (2014:338) claims, a 'thick' form of solidarist regional international society, which is also constituted in a thinner, pluralist

international society. Furthermore, with regards to the EU, the international society does not only assist, and establish before, the development of a world society within its geographical proximity but the two societies also complement each other (Stivachtis, 2014:338). Together with the need of non-EU states and pressures of international anarchy in order to preserve relationship with regional international organization, have enabled the EU to dictate certain outcome and enforce certain standards of behaviour on regional international organization. Stivachtis (2014:338) shows that elements of world society in the EU spread internationally in several ways: firstly via the EU's enlargement policy, secondly through the use of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and lastly through setting certain standards for non-EU states to conform in order to receive financial and humanitarian aid. Stivachtis (2008:91) explains that the EU members states mainly concerns about being certain that the Union can effectively function in spite of a high number of newly states becoming a member. As a consequence, they set standards, norms, and practices which lead to homogeneization in order to have effectiveness (Stivachtis, 2008:81). However, those standardisations whether it's a norm or practices are more or less similar to those elements in the historical standard of civilisation. A case of the EU enlargement is an example which can be observed as "a continuation of old practices" (Stivachtis, 2008:81). Similar line of argument on a new form of standard of civilisation in relations to regional society can be found outside classical English School's regional society (cite those works). With regards to central Asia, statesmen and policy-makers often use integration to refer to two possible results: first, re-establishing the Soviet sphere mainly under the purview of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which is pioneered by Russia depending on Russia's interests and conducts of engagement, second, Euro-Atlantic integration, which is an inclination towards western European organisation such as the EU and NATO (Pourchot and Stivachtis, 2013:68).

Although there are some works in the ES which touch upon regional powers, most of them evade to define and tackle the concept of regional powers directly, and in relations to international society as well. On this basis, the existing works of regional powers in the ES revolves around a strategic positioning, domestic actors, what constitutes regional international society, of a particular region and country. Merke's (2015) use of the ES on Brazil to problematize regional powers and posit Brazil's strategic stance in international relations. He explores the rise of Brazil and suggests that it will be surrounded by tensions and dilemmas,

adding further that the rise of Brazil will make more of its own dilemmas on how to tackle the question of order and justice in South America (Merke , 2015:189). The second point is that Brazil's stance on South America is too selfish to lead while too weak to cause any harm on its neighbours. This simply implies that regional powers could share a level of non-absolute regional hegemony. Lastly, Merke (2015:190) argues that hegemony and the balance of power are overtly given the importance in both academic and diplomatic community. The ES view enlighten the understanding of the region via the interplay between primary institutions of international society such as international law, diplomacy and great power management (Merke, 2015:190). From the ES perspective, South American regional society ceases to be institutionalised cooperation while going beyond the game of power politics (Merke, 2015:190). Another instance is Seagle's analysis of how Romanian domestic actors conceptualise the European Union through the ES lens (Seagle, 2014:65). Seagle asserts that The ES scholars often study the EU from the perspective of a society through the framework of international society (Seagle, 2014:66). There are differences between EU as a regional society and EU as a regional organisation. The differentiation can be seen from, on the one hand, the membership of international organisation is pursued as long as the interest in the organisation matters to them, on the other hand, through the society perspective, states care about society's norms, common values, resort to international law, and interests (Seagle, 2014:66).

Seagle (2014:66) seeks to examine how a society is constructed by actions of domestic actors and meanings. Views of diplomats, governmental elites, and state leaders are examined through Romanian government with regards to the structures of European institutions. Apart from a strategic positioning and the role of domestic actors of a particular country, the closest work which succeed in conceptualising regional society but fail to offers the notion of regional power is Ayooob's article on the construction of regional order (1999:248). Ayooob points out the distinctiveness of regional society by emphasising that the conceptualisation of regional society must go beyond what international society requires which is fairly minimal in character (Ayooob, 1999:248).

The reason behind more expectation of regional society is that, before being regarded as a region, states more or less must accept the rules of international society in their interaction with each other (Ayooob, 1999:248). It should be pointed out that being part of the international

society does not guarantee the security of its members. Thus, suggesting “security” as part of the construction of regional society could be another way of adding its value (Ayoob, 1999:248). Lastly, Stivachtis and Webber substantiates Ayoob’s conception of regional society by providing an empirical example of regional society (2011:112). The work and existence of NATO, the EU, the CoE and the OSCE shows that the organisation of international society at the sub-global level exists. The EU could also be considered as an exemplary of a form of regional international society (Stivachtis and Webber, 2011:112). From this, it should be noted that, on this basis, a ‘region’ is determined by the existence of regional organisation which involves more than three states in close regional proximity, which work together to search for common grounds within the context of legally codified regional institutions (Hulse, 2016:9).

2. Why is there A Lacunae of Regional Powers in the English School (ES) of International Relations?

The focus of the ES is on the international society, or a society of states, which concerns the maintenance of order among sovereign states. The thrust of this concept is that states come together and interact to an extent until they form a society which bound them to act according to a common set of rules through the institutions of international society such as the Balance of Power, International Law, Diplomacy, War and Great Power Management (Bull, 1977:13, 97-222). In the society of states, states often negotiate differences and eventually share the normative or institutional framework in a given historical period, together (Murray, 2018:19). The degree of unity, integration, and cooperation between states in international society mainly depends upon the behaviour of the great powers, the impact of the world society, the stability of the international system, and the domestic affairs within states (Murray, 2018:20). As mentioned earlier in the second section that although regional international society has become more popular in the ES literature, none of them has yet to explore, and outline, the role(s) of regional powers in international society to the same extent as Bull did in his major work, the Anarchical Society. The reason for such gloss over is due to nature of the ES itself which has originally been fixated on the expansion story at the global level (Buzan, 2014:57).

As the School became quite well-known at the peak of the Cold War, touching upon the role of regional powers could have been conflictual and divisive (Buzan, 2014:57). The Cold War is easily constructed as two great powers vying for global dominance. As such, any regional perspectives could lead to the view of international society being undermined at the global level (Buzan, 2014:57).

Furthermore, not only has the ES concerns about maintaining order through the institutions of international society but also to cover the needs of Asian, African and Latin American countries for just change in terms of redistributing resources, ending colonialism and white supremacist regimes, and eliminating the subordinated role of those states in relations upon rich countries (Humphreys, 2017:318). Having said that, in the ES view, the characteristics of regional powers cannot fulfil these responsibilities.

Although regional powers are regarded as being powerful in their own regions, they are geographically limited when it comes to wielding and exerting their powers globally (Flemes, 2007:9). Regional Powers are, as Wright puts it (1978 cited in Flems, 2007:10),

“States with general interest relative to a limited region and the capacity to act alone in this region, which gives them the appearance of local great powers.....”

The ability of regional power is more or less depends upon the powers of the involved states (Nolte, 2010:889). The effect of great powers on regional power will be different depending upon regional power's level of strength and the chosen policy in this and that areas. Some regional powers could be dominant within their own region while have little say at the international level (Nolte, 2010:889).

Secondly, a lack of emphasis of regional powers is also due to the historical fact of the regional powers. Some states are ex-colonial states or, generally, states which do not meet “the standard of civilisation” (need to cite ed's articles and articles on civilisation from Millennium journal). Decolonisation might be seen as a means which ended the ‘standard of civilisation’ (Buzan, 2014:66; Watson, 1992: 294-298). However, the elimination of European powers' empires did not really take away the question of entry into international society (Buzan,

2014:66). To be more precise, decolonisation yields another form of obstacle to international society: how the newly emerged states, including regional powers, can be socialised into the standard of European international law and institutions (Gong, 1984). The complication is surrounded by postcolonial resistance to an international society which has been originally constructed around colonial exploitation (Pasha, 2017:100). In other words, all the new jargons after decolonisation such as conditionality of sovereign states, international law, institutions of international society, are basically an extension of the European civilising project (Pasha, 2017:100). Despite the fact that the ES does not utterly emphasize its conviction to that project as its main feature, instead it settles, as Pasha (2017:100) argues, “.....on endless scuffles between pluralist and solidarist tendencies and their respective potential within international society.....”

The ES expects Great Powers Management as an institution of international society because they have both the material and non-material factors to preserve and adjust the elementary or primary goals of the society of states (Bull, 1977: 1-94, 97-222). Great Power Management as an institution of international society is not just one of the institutions, but it is arguably perceived by the ES scholars as an essential tool to maintain order between sovereign states (Bull, 1977; Bull and Watson, 1984;Wight, 1977;Wight, 1978). In the context of the ES, the institution of the great powers reduces complexities of international politics (Clark, 2011:34). It is able to do so due to a divergence of powers it possesses. To be more precise, the contribution of the great powers to international order is delivered by a variety of managerial functions (Bull 1977: 20 cited in Clark, 2011). It simply serves as an entity which facilitate member states of international society to pursue “collective goals and enshrine shared values” (Morris, 2005:265).

As mentioned earlier, some regional powers are ex-colonial states which deem to fulfil the same responsibilities and given external rights as any other sovereign states but they lack the institutional features of sovereignty accordingly to international law and bereft of authority and empowerment domestically (Jackson, 1990:21). They have weak empirical statehood, meaning that they cannot live up to the standard which their populations supposed to enjoy the same degree as advantages of traditional independent statehood (Jackson, 1990:21). Their governments are usually lacking the political will, do not possess enough institutional authority,

and have little organized power to meet the standard of human rights or implement substantial economic welfare policy (Jackson, 1990:21). Both the social and economic benefits are only spread among traditional elites and has not yet been shared to the populations as a whole whose lives could have been better by independence. These states could be summed up as primarily juridical statehood. In this context, the ES sees the conditions for a stable international order as more likely when the dominant power (Great Powers) has overwhelming capacity over other ordinary states (Nolte, 2010:888). Great powers enforce and defines rules of the society of states. In doing so, Great Powers prove that they are successful in projecting the political and economic distribution which they provide domestically to the international arena (Nolte, 2010:888). As a result, Great Powers would gain legitimacy to lead and conduct international order because they are considered successful domestically (Nolte, 2010:888). Hence, in the view of the classical ES, ex-colonial states, including some regional powers, are still far behind empirical statehood which Great Powers possesses in order to maintain international order (Jackson, 1990:21).

Pluralist International Society has always preferred Great Powers over regional powers per se which can be seen from many of the frameworks which aim to contain any lesser powers (Morris, 2005:272). International Society has laid down a new platform for regional powers, and ex-colonial states, using the language of primary and secondary institutions as a disguise. On the one hand, the United Nations as a secondary institution is a case in point. The UN Charter created new rules especially for states, which are outside of the category of great power, via particular provisions such as the contents in Chapter XI and XII (need to develop this point, find the actual primary sources for this) (Morris, 2005:272). They are there for a process of decolonization which would inevitably lead to a global level. Morris points out that this also reflects a lack of consensus among great powers about whether the territorial define state should be a fundamental political entity which should be used to determined future of the people: “the UN's Declaration on Independence for Colonial Counties and Peoples (UN General Assembly Resolution 1514(XV), 14 December 1960) declared that 'inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence’” (UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 cited in Morris, 2005:272).

3. Defining Regional Powers

Regional powers are partly determined by characteristics which possess predominant material capacities when compared to other states in the region (Hulse, 2016:7). They could be defined as states which demonstrate exceptional economic development relative to other countries in the region, and a higher level of military and political power which can be used to influence international politics (Destradi, 2016:17). To be more precise, they can also be carefully examined by different means when compared to other states within their region; by military power, population and collective GDP (Hulse, 2016:9).

Although material dominance is an integral criterion of regional powers, it should not be solely judged in absolute power capabilities (Neumann, 1992: xiii). Instead, to reiterate, comparing to other states' ability in the region is equally important, and should be included in the equation as well. Examples can be seen from Australia in Oceania, Indonesia in Southeast Asia, China and Japan in East Asia, to South Africa in African region (Bolarinwa, 2013; Hellendorff and Schmitz, 2014; Katzenstein and Rouse, 1993; Makinda, 1992; Morrison, 1993; Zhao, 2004). Applying a factor of material dominance in comparison with states within a region, most scholars believe that Australia, Germany, Brazil, China, Russia, India, Japan, and South Africa are regarded as regional powers (Hulse, 2016:9). On this basis, a 'region' is determined by the existence of regional organisation which involves more than three states in close regional proximity, which work together to search for common grounds within the context of legally codified regional institutions (Hulse, 2016:9). Regional powers are deemed to assert their influence on regional peacemakers, police and leading a role of moral authority (Flems, 2007:10). Furthermore, regional powers see themselves as having a duty to play a leading role (Hulse, 2016:7). Powerful states oftentimes project the image of themselves as leaders of their regions and also incline to assert their claim towards representing the interests of the whole region (Hulse, 2016:7). Nevertheless, those states frequently fail to invest and pay for what they often preach, resulting in what Hulse (2016:7) calls "expectations-reality gap".

Apart from the characteristics of regional powers, it is crucial to distinguish the differences and shared characteristics between the notion of "middle power" and "regional power" (Nolte, 2010:890). Traditional middle powers appear to focus on their role in international politics while

the newly emerged middle powers are both, at the same time, regional powers and middle powers on a global scale. However, it is better for our understanding to differentiate between middle powers and regional powers in terms of leading power, which is constituted by self-conception, leadership, and power resources (Nolte, 2010:890). Leadership is also defined by how influential states are politically in diplomatic forums, which can also be wielded by middle powers. Regional powers always prioritise power and leadership over resources. On the contrary to middle powers, regional powers hold a special responsibility for regional order and security in maintaining stability in the region (Nolte, 2010:890). Nevertheless, for regional powers to play along this role, they need to meet the following conditions:

- The domestic dynamics of regional power should enable it to play a leading and stabilising part within its region (Nolte, 2010:890).
- Regional power should be able to show its capability and willingness to be a stabilizer, peacekeeper, peacemaker and regional leader (Nolte, 2010:890).
- Regional powers should be acceptable among its neighbours, who are considered being part of the membership of the security complex in which it works, as a leader looking after regional security (Nolte, 2010:890).

4. The Role of Regional Powers

Their responsibility is to maintain regional order while sometimes having a considerable degree of support from the great powers (Flems, 2007:10). In addition, regional powers are expected to enhance and advocate for acceptable standards, rules and norms in the matters of a conduct of regional relations and politics (Flems, 2007:10). They have the resources to demonstrate their power within their own region whilst a global power is a country with the capacity to exercise its power over many regions (Kim and Urpelainen, 2015:216). It is worth bearing in mind that the empirical information of superior material capabilities does not necessarily mean that powerful states must lead other states in their region (Hulse, 2016:7). Still, it is widely believed that powerful states have a burden of care and responsibility towards

sub-regions, and expecting regional powers to maintain regional order within their regions (Hulse, 2016:7).

Although most scholars consider China, India, Brazil and South Africa as regional powers, fluctuations of power in countries which seem to play an important role such as Germany, Japan, and Brazil, show us that membership in the club of regional powers can be altered in different circumstances (Destradi, 2016:17). For example, it is true that Russia is a member of the BRICS but it does not belong in the same category of having exceptional economic prowess, instead it ought to be seen as a declining power and an 'outlier' (Destradi, 2016:17). In spite of that, the United States is the most powerful global leader in most areas (Kim and Urpelainen, 2015:216). Nonetheless, countries such as Brazil, China, India, South Africa and others exist as regional powers. Kim and Urpelainen (2015:216) focus on a variety of regional powers' capacities to achieve political-economic alliances with other states within a region, assuming that global power's interests and regional power's interests do not go along the line with each other (Kim and Urpelainen, 2015:216). There are a number of instances which substantiate this claim. China has become a leading regional power in Asia which results in the rivalry between the United States and China in making alliances with different Asian countries in the region (Kim and Urpelainen, 2015:216). Another example is Pakistan's dismay of the United States because of the military intervention in Afghanistan. This leads to suspicion among security and foreign policy makers in the United States towards a strong relationship between China and Pakistan (Kim and Urpelainen, 2015:216). This would deter the United States from imposing its influence effectively on Pakistan's policies (Kim and Urpelainen, 2015:216). However, it should be pointed out that China and Pakistan have created preferential trading agreement in 2006 (Kim and Urpelainen, 2015:216). As Pakistan's growing dependence for China in terms of economic and security benefits, the United States must work harder to gain Pakistan's policy concessions, for example, cooperating together to tackle the problems of terrorism. This has made American leaders anxious, now that friendship with Pakistan are already fragile (Kim and Urpelainen, 2015:216).

Conceptualising Regional Powers of International Society in the Asia-Pacific Region In order to substantiate Nolte's proposal of the role of regional power, I would like to draw relations between some of Hedley Bull's conceptualisations of Great Powers Management, namely

avoidance and control of crises, preservation of the balance of power, and sphere of influence, interest, or responsibility, and Nolte's conceptualisation of regional power, such as domestic elements of regional powers should not prevent them from leading and stabilising conflicts within the region, the willingness of regional powers to be a stabilizer, peacekeeper, peacemaker and regional leader, and partly the acceptance of regional powers from their neighbours. The relations between Bull's and Nolte's conceptualizations will be analyzed through important but controversial issues in Asia-Pacific Region. All of the examples argue in the similar line of argument--- regional powers are able to maintain international order despite skirmishes at the regional while contributing to international order at global levels as well.

5. Regional Powers Management: Avoidance of Conflicts or Control of Crises

At the end of the Cold War, China and India started to develop a framework of engagement (Dutta, 2011:128). Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi had visited Beijing in December 1988 for the first time in 34 years, to meet Deng Xiaoping, China's leader at the time, and Communist Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang (Dutta, 2011:128). After that, several talks ensued, such as Prime Minister Narasimha Rao's talks with Premier Li Peng in 1993, and President's Jiang Zemin's talks in New Delhi in 1996 which marked a six-fold plan for improving relations (Dutta, 2011:128). The cooperation between the two countries involved confidence building between security issues, especially in relation to military, having high-level official summits and exchanges, maintaining order and stability on territorial disagreements, searching and supporting cultural and educational exchanges, enhancing economic ties and strengthening trade relations and opening tourist sectors (Dutta, 2011:128). The cooperation redresses the tension and strain of the relationship during the following two decades and maintain stability (Dutta, 2011:128).

Despite the improvement in the relationship between the two countries, undeniably, in the contemporary period, China and India have encountered a number of disputes, be it territorial disputes, Tibetans in exile, concerns over the building of dams on the Yarlung-Tsangpo River, to China's attempt to build alliance with Pakistan with the aim of balancing India. However, the most urgent issue cannot be anything else apart from the possession of nuclear weapons of both countries. In the recent event, in June 2020, a military clash over the conflicted areas in

the Himalayas, has undermined the relationship between China and India (Dalton and Zhao, 2020). The military conflict on the shared border in the Galwan Valley is the worst violent confrontation the two possessors of nuclear weapons have ever had in the past fifty years (Dalton and Zhao, 2020). This tense confrontation focuses on the long time but rigorous competition between China and India (Dalton and Zhao, 2020). The most perplexing question derived from this clash between the two countries is why nuclear weapons have not been pushed forward into the scene. The answer lies in one of the characteristics, which is the attempt to control and avoid crises, of China and India as regional powers.

With regards to India, since the 1960s, given that India is outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Indian diplomatic focus has been about persuading major international actors that it could still be regarded as nuclear responsible (Leveringhaus and Estrada, 2018:10). India as a regional power did not follow the request to sign the NPT and CTBT (Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty), the main goal of the United States' negotiators attempt to create bilateral agreement in the wake of the test and the UNSC Resolution 1172 (Leveringhaus and Estrada, 2018:10). Rather, India chose to comply to the requirements of NPT signatories in a different way, by providing the nuclear technology to non-nuclear states as stating in the Article I of the Treaty, and since the 1998, has been willing to follow the standards of the voluntary moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons (Leveringhaus and Estrada, 2018:10). Indian authorities have been proud to show India's outstanding contribution on the non-proliferation of nuclear materials and informing the public about technicalities of nuclear weapons beyond its borders (Leveringhaus and Estrada, 2018:10). In 2005, India introduced Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems Act while in 2013, it updated the national export control list (Leveringhaus and Estrada, 2018:10). The list of dual-use items is Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and Technologies (SCOMET) which has been developed in accordance to those of the NSG and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) (Sullivan, 2014: 4). From all these improvements, India wanted the world to see that India was willing to follow international standards.

One the other hand, China sees its relations with India as considerably cooperative, influenced by, shared common interests in avoiding crises, and having both regional power and a potential great power status in international society (Dalton and Zhao, 2020). One Chinese academic

pointed out that China never consider India as a direct threat, but other Chinese scholars see the relationship as more about competition in the regional level. Supporting this view are controversial topics related to the Himalayas border dispute and the interactions with Pakistan as well as contrasting visions for future global governance in the Indo-Pacific region (Dalton and Zhao, 2020). Conventionally, Chinese strategists hold the view that nuclear weapons serve only as instrumental and strategic deterrence. Thus, the broader picture of China-and India relations is very positive when it comes to nuclear weapons, making them less relevant. Specialists on Chinese studies believe that India only aims to maintain positive international environment for economic prosperity and has no incentive for a nuclear conflict with China (Dalton and Zhao, 2020). They assert that the economic relationship will prevent Indian leaders from severing the bilateral relations (Dalton and Zhao, 2020).

6. The Avoidance of Conflicts and Control of Crises in the East-China Sea Disputes

The East China Sea disputes pose considerable divisions over both maritime and territorial conflicts in the East Asia (Shea, 2015:549). Maritime dispute is derived from overlapping claims of sovereignty whilst conflicts over territory is caused by disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which is located in the conflicted maritime areas (Shea, 2015:549). The priority of Chinese security and foreign policy remain related to the claim of Japanese sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the creation of maritime boundary of Japan in the East China Sea (Duchâtel, 2016:13). However, both China also asserts ownership over Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. While Japan administers these islands at present, China asserts sovereignty over them (Panda, 2017). The East China Sea disputes have sunk into a military, diplomatic, and political quagmire in China-Japan relations (Duchâtel, 2016:13). Leading academics, military and political figures from both sides express their concerns over potential escalation risks and promptly calling for enhanced control of crises (Liff and Erickson, 2017:605).

The MACM is one of the tools of crisis management consultation between the military forces from China and Japan (Duchâtel, 2016:14). The aim of MACM is to prevent and control undesirable clashes during close proximity of, and to be a means of communication for, both disputed parties (Duchâtel, 2016:14). Under the responsibility of this mechanism, Japan and China agreed to hold senior official and expert-level meetings with the aim of examining

technical and operational problems which need to be tackled (Japan times, 2018). They also reassure that the Self-Defense Forces and the Chinese military will stand by the present communications protocols between naval and aerial forces to prevent further conflicts (Japan times, 2018).

China and Japan agreed to cooperate on the East China Sea dispute in 2018 by setting up "conflict communication mechanism" which involves using hotline in order to deter aerial and maritime clashes over disputed claims in the East China Sea (Sim, 2018). The then Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Premier Li Keqiang signed an agreement to create a hotline within 30 days for high level defence officials to negotiate and exchange views with each other (Sim, 2018). Apart from the hotline, both leaders provided meetings between senior defence officers from both countries to communicate about maritime incidents (Sim, 2018).

Besides regional powers' role in controlling crises in the East China Sea, both China and Japan also promote common interests in avoiding historical conflicts between the two countries by establishing establish a Joint History Research Committee so as to lessen tensions and depoliticize the topic of the colonial past (Hughes, 2009: 843). In terms of contributing to the control of crises at the global level, Japan also donated \$13 billion to the US military intervention in Iraq in 1990-1991 (Sakaki and Lukner, 2013: 164). Later on, Japan took a further step by deploying SDF troops to UN peacekeeping missions in Cambodia, Zaire, Mozambique, and East Timor (Sakaki and Lukner, 2013: 165).

7. Australia's Contribution to the Control of Crises at the Global Level

Counterterrorism has undeniably been an indispensable aspect of EU-Australia security cooperation (Matera, 2018:229). Australia and EU nations have encountered detrimental effects of terrorist violence against their citizens. By working on information sharing and political dialogue on terrorism and collaborating to enhance effective international effort to prevent and fight against terrorism via the United Nations, the EU and Australia have determined to find a common grounds in order to 'fight against terrorism in full respect for the rule of law and human rights' (Australian Government and EU 2017, Article 9.1 cited in Matera, 2018:229). This leads

to effective engagements between the EU and Australia in several levels, be it bilateral, multilateral, and regional (Matera, 2018:229).

Australia understands that the EU is a crucial partner and an essential security actor (Matera, 2018:229). After the end of the Cold War, particularly since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack in the United States, the EU and Australia have strengthened their security cooperation (Matera, 2018:229). The security engagement between the two countries have concentrated on topics related to counterterrorism, the promotion of peace and stability, data sharing and law enforcement. Australia's security environment has been shaped by concerns related to the changing of a rules based international order, state fragility, and threat of terrorism (Matera, 2018:229). In terms of counterterrorism and law enforcement, Australia and EU work in tandem in several dimensions. For example, Australia and EUROPOL come into terms in February 2007 to exchange, and assist each other on, information sharing between Australia Federal Police and EUROPOL (Matera, 2018:229). This results in collaboration in solving terrorism and transnational crimes such as drug and human trafficking, and illegal immigrant smuggling (Matera, 2018:229).

Australia's involvement in the EUAM Iraq shows a substantial level of acknowledgement by the EU and Australia of their shared values in contributing to stability in the Middle East (Matera, 2020: 4). The Australian authority sees its deployment to EUAM Iraq as a significant contribution to the control of crises globally as it was the first time that Australia assisted EU-led humanitarian mission (Matera, 2020: 4). The Australian government has contributed through several means such as providing know-how on election, personnel for peacebuilding, humanitarian aid, disaster management, and justice assistance (Matera, 2020: 4).

Regional Powers Management: Balance of Power Japan-India-Australia Alliance States want information on the ongoing affairs in the South China Sea because they need reassurance whether they should dispatch warships or aircraft (Nagao, 2015:4). As of late, there has been an increment at the number of Japan's Maritime Self Defense warships and aircraft sent off to Vietnam and the Philippines (Nagao, 2015:4). It should be noted that Australian submarines often searched and collected essential data in the South China Sea, during the Cold War. The current situation calls for a similar action (Nagao, 2015:4). The occasional presence of India's

battleships in the countries, which have been in conflicts in the South China Sea, has similarly risen (Nagao, 2015:4). Nevertheless, as each of the battleships and air-forces can only be presence in a brief period of time, the aforementioned countries could substitute for each other or shift guards, accordingly share the received or obtained information, and hence inspect the South China Sea frequently (Nagao, 2015:4).

In addition, capacity building substantiates the existence of trilateral partnership, showing what can be done in terms of security concerns (Nagao, 2015:4). For a certain period of time, Japan has enhanced the improvement of disaster management and anti-piracy measures in Southeast Asia. Currently, Japan is also providing useful equipment, such as patrol ships and aircraft, to Philippines and Vietnam. Likewise, Australia has contributed to preparing and training Special Forces and assisted the training of the UNPKO in Vietnam (Nagao, 2015:4). India's initiative programme for training fighter pilot and submarine crews in Vietnam also reflects a solid capacity building strategy (Nagao, 2015:4). Plus, India has plans to provide four offshore patrol vessels to Vietnam. The meaningful result in capacity building would, in this way, be a situation in which these three states were to enter into constructive and cooperative project, where overlaps would not occur and appropriate help would be given (Nagao, 2015:4). For instance, in the case that Japan and Australia built an airport and other provisions in Vietnam, and if the Indian Air Force helped Vietnam with the training of fighter pilots, Vietnam would at that point obtain the benefits of fighter pilot training and an airport (Nagao, 2015:5). This trilateral cooperation of Japan-India-Australia would serve the benefits of the allied members (Nagao, 2015:5).

These three states could also work together to demonstrate their presence (Nagao, 2015:5). The example of being presence is the Japan-US-India Trilateral Malabar Exercises which took place in 2011, which aimed to be implemented near the Okinawa islands of Japan (Nagao, 2015:5). Despite the fact that Japan was not presence in the joint exercises because of the damage from the Great East Earthquake, it was however appreciated the act of the United States and India for carry out the exercises. This trilateral exercise is wisely planned to show their balance of power exercise since the Chinese naval was frequently dispatched near Okinawa islands (Nagao, 2015:5). Japan needed to move some of its warships from Okinawa islands to the areas affected by the earthquake in order to put rescue operation into action

(Nagao, 2015:5). Under such tension, the presence of the security allies such as India and the United States, in the words of Nagao (2015:5), “sends a strong signal to China to deter from exercising its policy of aggression against Japan.”

8. Indonesia's Balance of Power

While Chinese claims over Islands in the South China have been sufficiently disputed by Indonesian foreign policy experts, Indonesia further responded by showing its desire to increase military air patrols in the region and support people to move to Natuna Islands (Umbach, 2000: 178). It has also implicitly encouraged the United States to be more involved in its engagement in the conflicts. In the summer of 1996, Indonesia demonstrated its balancing act by initiating the largest air, land and naval manoeuvres, and other military operations such as amphibious assaults and airborne landing, using more than 19,000 servicemen, 40 combat aircrafts, and 50 warships around the area on Natuna Islands to reassure China of its seriousness in defending the sovereignty of the islands (Umbach, 2000: 178). Indonesia is known for having a navy which is still mainly a coastal defense force (Umbach, 2000: 178). Thus, Indonesia needed to strengthening and widen its defense relations with Australia and the United States. It is now trying to open its water more broadly for free movement of foreign warships and submarines (Umbach, 2000: 178). Given Chinese claims of sovereignty over the South China Sea, Australia's move to signed a bilateral security agreement with Australia in December 1995 was a reasonable and strategic plan so as to be prepared for a potential military confrontation with China (Umbach, 2000: 178).

9. Regional Powers Management: Sphere of Influence or Sphere of Collaboration?

India's ambition in the Indian Ocean are influenced significantly by its concern about the increasing presence of the Chinese in the region (Hornat, 2015: 10). Th String of Pearls causes concern about a likelihood Chinese 'containment' of India and the fear that China might attempt to play the same role in the Indian Ocean as it asserts political and economic dominance in the East and South China Seas. India has been reacting to the Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean by deploying a navy communication satellite which is able to cover the whole of the Indian Ocean, creating the construction of the port facility in Chabahar, Iran, and establishing a

station in Madagascar (Hornat, 2015: 10). In addition to enhancing its relations with Southeast Asian nations as part of the Look East Policy, India has been explicitly developing its relations with Japan's strategy which China is very uncomfortable with. Furthermore, Former Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh regarded Japan as a 'natural and indispensable partner in our quest for peace and security' (Menon 2014 cited in Hornat, 2015: 10). Besides such recognition, Japanese Minister Shinzo Abe received an honour as the 'Chief Guest', which is specially reserved for the closest friends of India, to attend India's Republic Day Parade (Hornat, 2015: 10).

There are numerous points of convergence between China and India in the maritime sphere and economic activities (Mittal, 2019). In the maritime sphere, the security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) against piracy and terrorism threats, freedom and safety of navigation for seaborne commerce and preservation of the marine environment are major points of convergence. The PLAN and IN have operated jointly against piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off Somalia since 2008 (Mittal, 2019). On 5 May 2011, after a merchant ship, Motor Vessel (MV) Full City operated by a Chinese state-owned shipping company requested assistance against pirates, an IN maritime patrol aircraft located the vessel at sea (Mittal, 2019). The IN aircraft subsequently guided US and Turkish Navy forces to assist the vessel against the pirates. The Government of China expressed its appreciation to India on the successful conclusion of the operations (Mittal, 2019). In October 2013, the PLAN and IN participated in a multilateral drill focusing on anti-piracy and illegal immigration (Mittal, 2019). In April 2017, MV OS 35, a Tuvalu-registered bulk carrier was jointly assisted by the PLAN and IN against a piracy attack off the coast of Somalia (Mittal, 2019). Anti-piracy initiative has increased the interactions between the two navies (Mittal, 2019). In other words, these operations are considered as tools for cooperation and confidence building (Mittal, 2019).

There are many factors which indicate a sphere of cooperation between China and India in the economic and maritime activities (Mittal, 2019). With regards to maritime sphere, important points of convergence are ranged from working together in fighting against threats from piracy and terrorism (the security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs)), ensuring freedom and safety of navigation for seaborne commerce, and protecting marine environment (Mittal, 2019). Indian and Chinese navies had been working together to prevent piracy in the Gulf of Aden

and off Somalia since 2008. Furthermore, in May 2011, A government owned shipping company, Mortor Vessel (MV) Full City needed assistance to fight against pirates, IN maritime had come into play by locating the vessel at sea (Mittal, 2019). As a consequence, the IN aircraft also enhanced the Turkish and US Navy forces in order to help the vessel against the pirates. The Chinese government showed its gratitude to India on the generosity of India's cooperation. In October 2013, the Indian and Chinese naval forces joined together in a multilateral drill emphasizing on anti-piracy and illegal immigration (Mittal, 2019).

In addition to development in the expansion of naval advancement, the past decade has shown that India been extending its influence throughout the Indian Ocean (Brewster, 2010:3). The Indian Navy has been eager to form and expand security relationships which are created to strengthened India's ability wield its power and contain China's ability to further develop security relationships with other countries in the region (Brewster, 2010:3). As the Indian Ocean is known for having an enclosed sea, the Indian Navy thus gives special attention to the "Choke points" at entrances to the ocean near Arabian peninsula, southern Africa, and the areas which connects the Indian and Pacific Oceans via the Indonesian archipelago (Brewster, 2010:3). As the the Indian Navy's 2004 Maritime Doctrine suggests that being in control of the choke points mean that India would have a high bargain in the international power game (Brewster, 2010:3). The Indian Navy has also claimed itself and acted as the leading Indian Ocean power via such pioneering such as financing the multilateral Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, which is an event hosted by India, especially for navies of all littoral states in the Indian Ocean (Brewster, 2010:3).

The notion of the String of Pearls does help with the understanding of China's assertive behavior in the Indian Ocean region (Holmes and Yoshihara, 2008:378). China's alliances with Myanmar and Pakistan are the example. Beijing can use their strategic relationship with these two states to counter balance the United States' presence in the region, monitor India's rise and activities, and predict the pattern of maritime activities (Holmes and Yoshihara, 2008:378). China can also seek alternative routes provided by its alliances in order to avoid the chokepoint at Malacca. Chinese security advisors have also suggested China to build oil pipelines via Pakistan and Myanmar (Holmes and Yoshihara, 2008:378). The point of China's String of Pearls, in short, is the attempt to gradually build strong foundations of a strategic maritime

infrastructure which would increase the prospects of economic gain and its military presence in the Indian Ocean (Holmes and Yoshihara, 2008:378).

After the damage of the Bali bombings in 2002, counterterrorist response has become one of the defining features between Australia and Indonesia (Gyngell, 2007:108). Australia's contribution on this issue had been mainly on the Indonesian special forces which was a major Indonesian strike force counterterrorism operation. The security agenda was broadly demonstrated in a Memorandum of Understanding on counterterrorism signed in February 2002. The Prime Minister Howard had contributed \$10 million for the four-year plan of counterterrorism assistance, which was later expanded to \$20 million in 2004 (Gyngell, 2007:108). One vivid example of the assistance was the founding of a security entity in 2004 called the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JLEC) which has laid platform for training in countering terrorist as well as training law enforcement officers from Indonesia and Southeast Asia at large (Gyngell, 2007:108).

Moreover, in February 2006, a new special centre called A Transnational Crime Centre was, jointly funded by Australia, officially opened in Jarkarta in order to support the Indonesian National Police's capacity to ease the problems of drug trafficking, money laundering, cyber-crime, and terrorism. As the result of the cooperation between AFP and Indonesian police, the Australian government argued that the effectiveness and collaboration between the two had been an instrumental part in taking down more than 160 terrorists and associates who were complicit (Gyngell, 2007:108).

However, the war on terror did not tear apart the relationship between the countries, mainly because of the realisation of the Indonesian government on the seriousness of the terrorist problem (Smith, 2004:5). The collaboration between the Indonesian police and the Australian Federal Police marked a success due to the arrest of culprits in the Bali blast. Over 80 jihadi or more have been captured in short period of time or another or on the premise of detective work and thorough analysis of forensics (Smith, 2004:5). When Indonesia decided to punish two of the Bali bomb organisers by using death penalties, there were different opinions and reactions from the victims' relatives because they saw death penalties as immoral (Smith, 2004:5). However, any prospect of the protest from the Australian side against such punishment, was

put to rest after the Prime Minister Howard emphasised that his government would not intervene or object these sentences. Some commentators in Australia interpreted this as going along with the feelings of discontent over the Bali blast (Smith, 2004:5). Even before the destruction of the Bali blast, Australia still believed that terrorism was the primary threat. Indonesia concurred with such belief and added that secure partnership between the two countries was a key component in tackling the issue. Similarly, the priority of Australia was to maintain effective collaboration with Indonesia on the issues of war against terrorism (Smith, 2004:5).

10. Indonesia's Sphere of Collaboration

The first instance is the earthquakes which occurred in Bantul district situated near Yogyakarta on 27 May 2006 (Sulistiyanto, 2010:129). Australian citizens who lived in Yogyakarta and in Australia instantly started to gather sums in response to the pressing needs of the people who were affected by the earthquakes, providing necessities such as food and materials for fixing their houses. There were numerous Australian students who were studying in Yogyakarta but always found time to provide practical assistance to the victims of the earthquakes (Sulistiyanto, 2010:129). The Australian universities' consortium (ACICIS) network of students had an important role in helping victims. The fund raising was organised by Australian people from Adelaide with the goal of assisting families in Pundong village, Bantul district. The funding was dispatched to an Australian itinerant who could get access to contacts of these families directly (Sulistiyanto, 2010:129). The money was mostly spent for medical items, materials for building houses, and food. Some amount of money was used for purchasing domestic animals, which could be used to build a strong foundation for their well-being and could be used to benefit their small business later on. All of these were achieved because of the assistance from local friends and other non-state actors in Yogyakarta (Sulistiyanto, 2010:129).

Likewise, the second group is from the Network for Tsunami Aceh Inc (NTAI), which was found by residents, from both Indonesia and Australia, who lived in early 2005 (Sulistiyanto, 2010:129). The Network has been unequivocally backed by Indonesian students who studied and stayed in Adelaide. Since its creation, the Network has been able to get assets and resources in Australia so as to help short and long term activities related to educational and

welfare implementations in several villages in Aceh (Sulistiyanto, 2010:129). With the help of the Acehnese people, the Network also created a study camp and centre in Aceh in order to allow local children from the disaster areas to learn and participate in cultural activities. There had been development in relations to rebuilding the life and dignity of the Acehnese people (Sulistiyanto, 2010:129).

11. Conclusion

This article argues that there is a lack of emphasis on the relations between regional powers and the English School of International Relations. It further argues that the conceptualisation of regional powers can be drawn from the characteristics of regional powers proposed by Nolte's criteria of regional power and Bull's conceptualization of great powers such as avoidance and control of crises, preservation of the balance of power, and the sphere of collaboration between regional powers.

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