



GLOBAL MARITIME FULCRUM (GMF) PERFORMANCES TO
DEAL WITH TENSIONS IN SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES:
A CONSTRUCTIVIST ANALYSIS OF INDONESIA'S
STRATEGIC CULTURE

BY

MISS FEBRIANTI TENTYANA S TARNO

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS
(ASIA PACIFIC STUDIES)
COLLEGE OF INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES
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ACADEMIC YEAR 2017
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
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
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ABSTRACT

When Joko Widodo first came into power, there were some signals of the alteration of Indonesian foreign policy. In response to tensions in Natuna Islands in the beginning of his administration, Jokowi was ambivalent in carrying his maritime ambition, Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF). The maritime vision has successfully gained international statement and attention, especially from superpowers. Drawing on government official documents and qualitative interviews, this paper analyzes Indonesian “free and active” foreign policy to preserve neutral stance under Joko Widodo’s maritime ambition. Throughout his administration the level of sovereignty protection is escalating, whilst economic benefit was intensified by building tighter economic ties with China. Besides, Indonesian mediating role in the region also plays a significant role to sustain Indonesian identity in international sphere. To illustrate the rationality among three variables, the study centers on state leader persona and societal milieu in particular foreign policy fulfilment.

Keywords: “Free and Active” Foreign Policy, Global Maritime Fulcrum, Sovereignty Protection, Economic Benefits, Mediating Role

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Symbols/Abbreviations	Terms
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AEC	ASEAN Economic Community
AFR	ASEAN Regional Forum
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
CARAT	Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training
CBM	Confidence Building Measures
CEPA	Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement
CoC	Code of Conduct
DoC	Declaration of Conduct
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
DGCA	Directorate General of Civil Aviation
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GMF	Global Maritime Fulcrum
ICWA	Indonesian Council on World Affairs
IORA	Indian Ocean Rim Association
IUU Fishing	Illegal Unreported Unregulated Fishing
MEF	Minimum Essential Force
MSRI	Maritime Silk Road Initiatives
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
OBOR	One Belt One Road
OLDEFOS	Old Established Forces
PDI-P	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan
SCS	South China Sea
SOM	Senior Officials' Meeting
SREB	Silk Road Economic Belt

TNI	Tentara Republik Indonesia
TNI-AL	Tentara Republik Indonesia-Angkatan Laut
TNI-AU	Tentara Republik Indonesia-Angkatan Udara
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention of Law of the Sea
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
U.S.	United States
UUD-45	Undang-Undang Dasar 1945



CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Issues and Significances

Territorial disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) have been unresolved for more than four decades which enticed political rendezvous in the Asia Pacific region. The disputes involve several Asian countries: Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, and some tensions with Indonesia. They intensified in the middle of the 1970s owing to China's claim over the entire South China Sea waters based on its historical heritage. China's overlaps territorial claim in the SCS with other countries' Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) based on the United Nation of Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Due to its geographical importance of international trade route connecting Indian and Pacific Ocean, China started to claim the waters in the post-World War by starting to redraw its maps, redefining borders, manufacturing historical evidence, using forces to create new territorial boundaries, renaming islands, and seeking to impose its version of history on the waters of the region Malik (2013).

Particularly, the tensions between Indonesia and China flared up in 1991 as Indonesia's Foreign Minister Ali Alatas showed his concerns for the emerging conflicts in the South China Sea. However, China did not respond to the concern, Indonesia has seemingly remained inert as it has not taken any direct action to China. The consideration taken since Suharto's era was because his concern toward national stability. It continuous until the recent period, by persistence of the "Free and Active" principle in international affairs and keep the neutrality toward the disputes (Aplianta, 2015, pp. 8-9). The "Free and Active" foreign policy is a supreme foreign affairs guidance which is free from alignment and active contribution in implementing global peace and stability.

Although Indonesia remain neutral, the latest maritime doctrine settled by President Joko Widodo, as preferably known as Jokowi, has been drawing

attention. His maritime doctrine of Global Maritime Fulcrum resulted the diplomatic commitment in maritime disputes as well as firmer protection behavior. The concept itself sounds nationalistic, yet, his behavior is relatively flexible in international affairs, especially regarding the China-Indonesia relation. He is quite open to cooperate with superpowers aiming to maintain and seek national interests. In contrast his predecessor, he has neither political nor military background. Therefore, scholar such as Conelly mentions that he does not have ability to handle effective foreign policies. However, his lack of diplomatic ability does not hinder himself from accomplishing the national gains in the recent global circumstance (Connelly, 2014, pp. 4-5)

In the Natuna Islands, China has been operating actively. From 2014 to 2016, Indonesian navy fired and seized 71 Chinese and Vietnamese illegal fishing vessels in the South China Sea in order to protect its maritime resources in line with Jokowi's maritime doctrine (Salna, 2016). At the same time, Jokowi has keep on maintaining partnership with China. He emphasized the bilateral ties with China targeting as a strategic trade partner for Indonesia. He met president Xi Jinping five times in less than two years from 2014 to September 2016 (Parline, 2016).

Jokowi has taken a unique path in dealing with the disputes of the SCS. His foreign policy could benefit Indonesia or put Indonesia in a hazardous position. Successful maintenance to avoid the tensions in Natuna Islands, could bring double benefits for Indonesia; mainly to use the existing interstate cooperation, and at the same time could manage the protection of its sovereignty. On the opposite way, Indonesia could possibly lose its trust from the international community. Using the concept of strategic culture, it is argued that Indonesian foreign policy, specifically its maritime strategy, is best explained from constructivist perspective. The latter most effectively demonstrates the apparent contradictions between current foreign policy and actual foreign policy behavior. A constructivist lens best caputes a hidden coherence that flows through Indonesian foreign policy, grounded in a domestic, normative factor – Indonesia's neutrality doctrine, guided by constitutional principles of Pancasila (the five principles).

1.2 Indonesian Foreign Policy and International Relation Theories

By examining Indonesia's behavior toward South China Sea disputes, some realists highlight the importance of national and international security. Most of realists agreed that the 'balance of power' is the main conception in considering the southeast Asia security. Misalucha (2014) stated that the balance of power by the superpower in the region (China, Japan, the U.S.) play major role especially in building a peace settlement (Misalucha, 2014, pp. 104-115). The study mentioned some scenarios to frame the relation between the power and tensions to maintain the international security. Those relations indicated the win-lose relation regarding the important roles for each countries in the region. She also highlighted the existence of American involvement which happened to balance the emerging Asian superpower, Japan and China.

Misalucha's finding basically contends with the sense of state's power. It could be said that by this point of view, the word 'power' determines international security. One thing which is lacking by the use of this theory is that Indonesia does not entirely see China as a threat even though it existed. Indonesia could sense the threat, but it prefers to see in another way around. The existence of power also strains to the perspective of conflict manifestation which Indonesia does not see it pragmatically. Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa swiftly clarifies that there is no overlapping maritime territorial dispute between Indonesia and China. Meanwhile, the domestic administration faces several frictions in responding the disputes. In 2014, Indonesian Army Forces (TNI) commander required more sufficient presence around Natuna which incoherently claimed by previous administration as another military base in Natuna Island is to house a helicopter squadron (Sambhi, Jokowi's 'Global Maritime Axis': Smooth Sailing or Rocky Seas Ahead?, 2015, p. 47). Indonesia by its lack coherence of the administration shows that not all of governmental elements see the critical threat in the Natuna Islands. In one side, military notices threat based on the physical interruption by Chinese illegal fishing activity. Meanwhile, from the foreign policy official point of view, it is not necessary to feel

endangered by China over territorial issue. This internal predicament could be the reason why realism does not explain the central factor of Indonesia's response toward South China Sea.

In accordance, Ramadhani (2015) examines the prospect of Indonesia's new maritime vision in the South China Sea disputes. By using neorealism perspective, she argues that power and security competition among superpower countries leads to a security dilemma in the international environment. The basic explanation is that states behavior in using their power would cause the tensions and lead to war. Her result is focused on the existence of superpower influence, mainly the U.S. ambition to rebalance Asia including the presence of arm races in the region. However, even though she noted that Indonesia is eager to promote the cooperation and emphasize mutual benefit among conflicted states, there is no further investigation (Ramadhani, 2016, pp. 84-86).

Therefore, realism and neorealism concept came with tangible material such as arms and other military hardware to articulate the power domination and express threats to the rival. Consequently, it could be called as a rivalry situation. For instance, In South China Sea case, China's behavior in the region in dominating the area by claiming territory, building artificial island, and setting up the military facilities on it (Reuters, 2017). Meanwhile the Indonesian approach is rather based on "Free and Active" foreign policy, particularly to guarantee the non-alignment tradition. This value is regardless to the tensions among China, claimant states, and the U.S. In conclusion, Indonesia will hold back from rivalry over the dispute.

On the other side, liberalism perspective presented by Djalal (2001) stressed the openness of the cooperation intra ASEAN and other countries (Djalal, 2001, pp. 98-104). His basic principle concentrates on the importance of interstate cooperation rather than to see other as threats. The common sense of anti-domination is crucial in maintaining the peace in the region. In term of conflict resolution, countries in the region must be able to have supportive coordination throughout adherence of the international law especially the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention particularly to be open to negotiation among the parties. This overview is

critical to the avoidance of realizing the power domination and world security. Djalal mainly regards to the peaceful meaning by cooperative engagement among countries (including conflicted countries). In line with that, Aplianta (2015), a diplomat who concern investigating Indonesian foreign policy toward South China Sea disputes, through his analysis on Indonesia response toward South China Sea disputes, described the escalating role of Indonesia in maintaining the peace and security. Basically, he stated that Indonesia playing a key role as the mediator to China and ASEAN conflicted countries. The growing response that developed from Soeharto era until Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as the honest broker into an active bridge builder help to preserving peace and stability (Aplianta, 2015, p. 16). According to his observation, he concluded that domestic politics, authority figure, and given role are the main conditions affect the formation of foreign policy to maneuver in the international environment.

Opposing to the realism, both Djalal (2001) and Aplianta (2015) studies found that Indonesia is leaning toward the peaceful stability in the region by less perceiving on domination and superpower threat. Beside, to be in the middle of disputants and active in contributing the Code of Conduct (CoC) and Declaration of Conduct (DoC) is the foreign policy purposes. In 2011 Indonesia was keenly endorsing ASEAN member countries and China in implementing the DoC during the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) which continued to the setting up of CoC before the meeting in Beijing (Aplianta, 2015). The findings generally discuss on how Indonesia acts on behalf of 'free and active' and somehow put less attention to the incidents that may occurs in the Natuna Islands.

Thus liberalist claims over peaceful and stability in the region could not be fully explain the existence of Indonesia's new maritime doctrine. Throughout the GMF, Jokowi is trying to turn back national reputation not only as a 'archipelagic country' but also to be 'maritime state' (Chen, 2014, p. 68). This is regarding to the role occupied by Indonesia as the center point of Pacific and Indian Ocean. Under the maritime strategy, Indonesia is trying to shift toward geostrategic focus on the Indo-Pacific. It implies to the strong intention of capitalizing Indonesia's 'middle

power' status and restructuring sea lanes in the rim. The GMF content which mainly aimed to extend the maritime regional leadership and expand the maritime power in Asia Pacific region is irrelevant toward liberal actions theory. The nature of Indonesia's foreign policy and GMF cannot unattainable to be explained by realism, neorealism, and liberalism.

Jokowi's maritime doctrine is aggressive, even he is inexperienced in the fields of foreign policy and international affairs. Even though ambitious, it remains hold onto Indonesia's Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) principle which is 'free and active'. NAM firstly established in the first summit in Belgrade in 1961. Indonesia had already committed itself started by Prime Minister Mohammad Hatta. The core of NAM is basically on the outlook on the world which means independent and free from foreign domination or great power entanglement. The *Dasasila* or Ten Principle of International Relation conceded in Asian-African Conference in Bandung in 1955 remains significant until recent period. Nevertheless, it does not mean that it has not been able to alter with the varying conditions through leaders and politics. Principle of the 'free and active' is not only relevance toward international affairs for Indonesia, moreover, it entitled the involvement in keeping the peaceful and stable world (Alatas, 2001, pp. 252-261).

Sukma (1995), the expert on Indonesian foreign policy marks the 'free and active' doctrine as a reflection of Indonesian historical, cultural, and political experience which initially demonstrated national policy. Even though in the New Order era under Suharto, Indonesian foreign policy had not been received much attention compare to the previous era (Sukarno), but it began arise in the mid-1980s. He notices the movement of maintaining a 'low profile' to international environment and initiated a more 'active' phase. There are two basic platforms principal to the neutrality of the foreign policy as following *anti-kolonialisme* (anticolonialism) and *politik luar negeri bebas-aktif* (free and active foreign policy). The nature of 'free and active' later reinterpreted in various ways of administration (Sukma, The Evolution of Indonesia's Foreign Policy: An Indonesian View, 1995, pp. 304-306).

Indonesia's foreign policy is likely constructed along the way with the changing environment, both externally and internally. The starting point of the foreign policy is basically relies on the struggle and diplomacy in order to attain independence. It had not yet ended there, during the Cold War Indonesia also faced the two opposing blocs in its internal politics; communist groups and incumbent government (Sukma, 1995). Moreover, Aplianta (2015) described the advancement of 'free and active' doctrine reinterpretation in each administration started from Suharto's era until the latest Yudhoyono's era. His explanations deciphered each characteristics of administration in putting out the neutrality particularly in responding the South China Sea disputes.

Indonesian "free and active" doctrine is a unique foreign policy experience because it well-kept through period of time. Furthermore, it is underlying the identity and idea of Indonesian behavior. As a democratic country, Indonesian government has been successfully preserving the neutrality stance without any distortion regardless to its domestic political domination. Generally, the value roots of Indonesian foreign policy is developed by the official construction and reconstruction of Indonesia's identity as a sovereign and independent country. In regard to the current GMF doctrine conceded in the aspiration of returning the identity of archipelagic country and maintaining national interests. To explain this unique experiences, strategic culture theory under constructivism will be adopted in the studies. The rationale is because compatible contents of strategic culture to explain Indonesia's identity as a neutral country at the same time Indonesia's efforts to be flexible to adjust international and national agenda.

Indonesian foreign policy analysts have argued that Indonesian identity as a Muslim majority state intervene the formulation both domestic and foreign policy. Al-Anshori (2016) and Anwar (2010) believed that the intangible aspect such as religion succeed to shape Indonesian approaches and reactions toward global issue. Anwar in her study of *Foreign Policy, Islam, and Democracy in Indonesia* examined Indonesia's special attributes as a Muslim-majority state and world's third largest democracy faces several challenges in front of the outside world. She mentioned

clearly that *“According to Yudhoyono, Indonesia’s independent and active foreign policy should have a constructive approach, prevent Indonesia from entering into military alliances and be characterized by connectivity, compelling Indonesia to have a healthy engagement with the outside world.”* (Anwar, Foreign Policy, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia, 2010, p. 39). The important note is that it is important to understand Indonesian foreign policy toward international issues as national reflection and image of Muslim-majority state. Rizal Sukma (2010) at the Wilton Park Conference in the UK in early March 2010 stated that *“One common suggestion, especially from the international community, is for Indonesia to play a role as a global Islamic voice. It is often argued that Indonesia, as the largest Muslim-majority country in the world, should demonstrate to the world that Islam can be a ‘positive’ force in world affairs. Indonesia, according to this view, should demonstrate that Islam can go hand in hand with democracy.”* (Anwar, 2010, p. 46). As a result, Indonesia’s approach toward foreign affairs and issues is also aimed to reflect national image of democratic and Muslim-majority state at the same time. Additionally, Al-Anshori examined the role of Islam in Indonesia’s contemporary foreign policy in reacting to three cases; Iran nuclear deal, Kosovo’s independence, and Palestine statehood. It resulted different pressure throughout each conflict. However the overall conclusion is that Indonesian Muslim group as an interest group convey their concern based on the global Muslim solidarity and sympathy which later determine the state’s stance (Al-Anshori, 2016, pp. 203-222).

The constructivism framework of foreign policy can also be visible in where Indonesian government attempted to establish its neutral posture in the South China Sea. Ruggie and Wendt in Peou (2002) discovered that constructivism takes into account the significance of culture, idea, ideology, and socialization. They reveal that the nature of cultural, norms, values and identities are playing key roles in determining the policy preferences beside of state leaders. In line with that Peou found that the constructivism headway in Northeast Asian security particularly in the early 1990s while Johnston specifically pointed ‘domestic strategic culture’ similarly Katzenstein and Berger came out with ‘domestic politics attitudes’. Furthermore, the

studies by Archarya highlighted tangible reference in the ASEAN security since the 1990s in seeking the peaceful meaning in order to ease the tensions and reduce the 'likelihood of war'. ASEAN countries, in regards to security community do not swamp down toward arms race by the mainstream balance of power sense (Peou, 2002, pp. 122-123).

Jokowi's ambition in regard to the maritime doctrine is irrelevant toward bellicose either assertiveness. Because the neutrality is one main component represents Indonesian foreign policy in general, moreover his administration focused on returning the image of 'archipelagic state', securing its maritime, as well as upgrading the naval technology. However, the government by the foreign policy cautiously applying the doctrine in the coastline. As non-claimant country, Indonesia takes a sidestep from potential tensions in Natuna Islands.

The ambivalence could be one actual consequence in regard of non-alignment principle. In the implementation of NAM, Jokowi set his priority by re-designating sea lanes as the country's political and geostrategic mission. He signals substantial foreign policy changes that will consistently affect relation with other countries. The mission to rebuild the identity of 'maritime state' and middle power will also be salient priority in order to expand the state-centric prism related to various sector (economy, maritime security, and national identity) (Chen, 2014, pp. 68-69). Based on the report of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia through GMF has tried to build a closer cooperation with superpower countries in the region. With China, Jokowi had visited Beijing in March 26th 2015 prior to establish continuous deeper relation of Indonesia-China through joint efforts to highlight the distinctive features of the comprehensive strategic partnership. That are namely; political, defense, and security, followed by trade, investment and economic development, maritime, aeronautics, science & technology, cultural and social affairs, international and regional affairs. Meanwhile, Jokowi visit to the United States in October 2015 and issued the Joint Statement in strengthening a Long-Term Partnership. The highlight is of the agreements is maritime, energy, defense cooperation, and people to people contacts. In the conclusion, there are several agreements and arrangements

concluded between two countries namely; Memorandum of Understanding on Maritime Cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the United States of America, Joint Statement on Comprehensive Defense Cooperation, MoU Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Cooperation on Energy, MoU Between the Federal Aviation Administration Department of Transportation of the United States of America and the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) of the Ministry of Transportation of the Republic of Indonesia on the Promotion of Sustainable Aviation Alternative Fuels and Renewable Energy (Kementerian Luar Negeri Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia, 2015). Those cooperation agendas above are in line to the five pillars aspects of the GMF, particularly in the maritime diplomacy and to build the maritime defense capability (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional, 2016).

Indonesian passage toward regional and international cooperation is basically neutral in a sense to put cooperation first intended to national interest and tensions avoidance. Toward Natuna Islands, the agreement between China and Indonesia merely emphasizes in the both favor toward deeper mutual benefits in less notion of discussing the tensions in Natuna Islands. As a inference, GMF nature is to locate Indonesia in the middle of international community in which open to assistance from superpower to engage with the internal objectives without neglecting its border protection through security and defense improvement. To link up the cases into the study, strategic culture will be taken into account. Under constructivism, strategic culture is a quite modern theory in explaining international security by examine nation's idea, identity, and behavior toward external disputes.

What missing in those studies is the internal dimension shown by most of realist, neorealist, and liberalist which tend to focus on external realm. Those three perspectives could not really explain the internal reason of why Jokowi by his ambition could be firm in one side while easy on the other side. Classical theory such as realism, argued mostly because of Indonesian lack of ability to be belligerent against superpower such as China. Similarly, neorealism focused on the maintaining

the 'security dilemma' from superpower's influence in the region such as United States and Japan. Meanwhile, liberalist argued concerning merely on the nature of peacekeeping role. The main loophole found here is fundamental intention of being neutral and ambitious simultaneously. In a long road, 'free and active' is strained as a paramount orientation of Indonesian foreign policy.

A realist, neorealist, and liberalist practically focused on the external realm covering power relation in the international community. Those perspectives basically value the universal changes as the condition underlying the Jokowi's maneuver in maritime security. Thus, perspectives could not really explain the internal reason of how can Jokowi by his ambition could be ambiguous in the deterrence of confrontation in Natuna Islands. On one side, Indonesia appears firm in the border, but also extensive in term of the superpower cooperation.

Indonesian behavior in articulation of neutral commitment toward international affairs, is not a new phenomenon. Weatherbee (2002) generally and Aplianta (2015) specifically in South China Sea disputes mention the development of Indonesian foreign policy. Weatherbee began with the idea of nonaligned stance as the projection of struggle for Indonesian freedom and independence as stated by Vice President Hatta in 1948. Moreover, the nonaligned also significance to its neutrality actions, also condition whereas the great power presence would be decrease while Indonesian regional role could rise (Weatherbee, 2002, p. 205). Specifically, Aplianta began with Indonesian leaders to response to South China Sea disputes while, for example, Suharto was more focused on domestic economy, and regional reputation in ASEAN (Aplianta, 2015, pp. 1-21). Those perceptions of Indonesian Foreign Policy are palpable to Indonesian tradition and culture in persistence of national image both internally and externally. Indonesia would like to express its concern toward peace and stability, and cautious in engaging international challenges. First, loaded with the image of neutral state. Second, Indonesia has always considering domestic affairs and reduce its ego to be one-sided. The significance of the studies in the academic fields is to enhance the understanding of

the Indonesian Foreign Policy Analysis as a branch of International Relations Studies through the lens of Strategic Culture conception.

1.3 Strategic Culture

This study will focus on examining the intangible factors and aspects underlying Indonesian foreign policy. Strategic culture had become fashionable in the international relation in the post-Cold War era. The concept is located in the international studies mainly focus on security matters. Lantis coined that strategic culture *“helps provide a bridge between material and ideational explanations of state behavior and helps to capture the tension between neo-classical realist and constructivist approaches”* (Lantis, *Strategic Culture and Security Policies in the Asia Pacific*, 2014, p. 166). This is significant to testify a response to Indonesia’s culture in preserving national identity, behavior, and culture to maintain Free and Active foreign policy.

There are various definition to explain the meaning of strategic culture. The comparison in defining strategic culture had been done by Sondhaus (2006, pp. 124-125) explain clear ideas of strategic culture by several scholars. Sondhaus’ table comparing the definition, durability, source and scope of representation, and role and/or impact of strategic culture reflects diverse highlights and points by each scholar. Snyder (1977), emphasizes that strategic culture is *“The sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy”*. His general understanding is penetrated in the Cold War period and tried to explain international security through nuclear strategy by USSR. The durability is basically indirect to respond the changing strategic environment. Meanwhile, Booth (1990) explain strategic culture in more specific meaning as *“A nation’s traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, symbols, achievement and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force”* which outlast but

major changes are possible regarding to military technology, domestic arrangement or the international environment (Sondhaus, 2006, pp. 124-125).

Meanwhile, the newest exploration of the study focusing on strategic culture as the indicators of significant grand strategy and state behavior (Lantis, *Strategic Culture and national Security Policy*, 2002). The study by Johnston in 1995 points out 'cultural realism' in Chinese security policy during Ming dynasty that influenced state behavior and much of human civilization history. Lantis also resulted linkage between culture and national security and stressed in three main elements; the government which sets the objectives of war; the armies, which fight it; and the people who support it. The particular cases had been taken in many various circumstances as such American and Soviet nuclear doctrines by Snyder; Colin Gray's *Nuclear Strategy and National Style*; and Alastair Johnston's *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Lantis, *Strategic Culture and national Security Policy*, 2002, pp. 93-97).

Even though strategic culture is trying to explain the resilience of nation identity, behavior, and idea, it does not mean that it will never reform through times. Booth (1990) analyzes that strategic culture "Helps shape but does not determine how a nation interacts with others in the security field" and "Helps shape behavior on such issues as the use of force in international politics, sensitivity to external dangers, civil-military relations and strategic doctrine" (Sondhaus, 2006, pp. 124-125). His explorations determine the characteristic of Jokowi's maritime ambition following the naval and military improvement. The GMF policy is one unique experience of the interactions toward international environment and border protection. The tensions in Natuna islands could be the real example to explain Jokowi's movement as the reaction of external threats (illegal fishing).

Inspite of vary debates and arguments in defining strategic culture based on contrasts sphere, it can be concluded that strategic culture is a nations' beliefs, traditions, and ideas to behave in order to solve problems and to react toward external threats. Specifically, Indonesian scholar, Yohanes Sulaiman in 2016, applied the strategic culture in Indonesia's national security inherent three important

themes; the unity of different ethnic groups and an illustrious history as the successor state of the ancient kingdoms of Srivijaya and Majapahit covering the identity of 'Wawasan Nusantara' or Archipelagic Insight; narrative the struggle for independence; and 'free and active' narrative shape Indonesian foreign policy meaning the independent from any military pacts or alignment with great powers (Sulaiman, 2016). Sulaiman's conclusion of Indonesia's strategic culture could be applied to measure Indonesian responses in the case of tensions in Natuna islands.

Strategic culture will also be employed to capture and explain the developed identity of Indonesia and its relation toward international affairs. Some scholars have mentioned important points of Indonesian identity such as; "Maritime State" (Chen, 2014, pp. 68-69), "Maritime Diplomacy Defense" (Laksmana, 2016), and Indonesia as 'Regional Entitlement' since 1980s (Weatherbee, 2002, p. 195). Chen's point is focused on Indonesia build-up not only as an 'archipelagic state', but also 'maritime state' meaning that Indonesia is reprioritising its maritime environment and sea lanes over traditional land-centric focus (Suryo in Chen, 2014, p. 70). Meanwhile, Laksmana, the defense and military expert, tries to portrait Indonesian grand strategy under President Joko Widodo's administration which scattered around diplomacy, defense, and maritime. The modernization of the armed forces and naval stimulates nation openness toward interstate cooperation, for example to Australia and the U.S. On the diplomacy effort, to maintain the peace and stability through diplomatic dispute settlement followed by the emerging regional role. Weatherbee (2002) mentioned that Indonesia since 1980s was identified as 'regional entitlement' which is playing pivotal role in the maintenance of regional stability and security showed by the activity on the peacekeeping missions.

In characterizing each variable, this study will adopt the Lantis's categorization on Strategic Culture shaping the country's political-military culture; sources and keepers (Lantis, Strategic Culture and Security Policies in the Asia-Pacific, 2014, pp. 172-175). The first source is the understanding of geographical context which in Indonesia's archipelagic landscape is vulnerable to outside threats. Another source is political culture as the nature of governance. This is critical to democratic

transformation in Indonesia with the following history of its civil-military relations. Post-Suharto regime, military has become a non-political institutions. Last, myths and symbols are also considered as part of important expression of a state idea and culture Lantis classified that myths are representing fascinating blend of fact and fiction. In Indonesia's case, official seal of Republic Indonesia articulates the independence date also the unity in diversity. Meanwhile, symbols act as 'socially recognized objects of more or less common understanding' and 'provide a cultural community with stable points of reference for strategic thought and action' (Lantis, 2014, p. 173). In the most obvious example is slogan used in Sukarno's administration "*Jalesveva Jayamahe*" meaning "Victorious in the Sea".

Major actors and institutions are recognized as the server and keeper of nation's culture. First, political leaders in whose engage in historical interpretation and development of the foreign policy path. For instance, Indonesian leaders in referring the Free and Active foreign policy. Second keeper is elites which Berger recognized the fact that strategic culture is best characterized as a "negotiated reality" among elites (Lantis, Strategic Culture and Security Policies in the Asia-Pacific , 2014, p. 174). During the candidacy, Megawati had a crucial role in supporting Joko Widodo. Besides, she is happened to be President Sukarno's daughter, this made it possible to conclude that there is some Sukarno's influences in Global Maritime Fulcrum. Lastly, political institutions including political parties and domestic coalitions are also affecting foreign policy behavior. In the case of Indonesia's parliament, the strong coalition is essential to establish resilient government.

Coherently, by developing identity built by Indonesia in recent administration, Strategic Culture adopted to testify Indonesian strategy under Joko Widodo's administration in the maintenance of maritime ambition. This also will employ Indonesian 'Free and Active' Foreign Policy to maintain the neutral stance which long-standing throughout periods in facing global security and stability challenges.

Lastly, the location of the study would be specific on foreign policy making process by constructivism approach specifically to support the Harold and

Sprout (1956) theory on the psychological and societal milieu (Hudson, 2008, p. 20). Harold and Sprout theories pointed several psychological indicators influencing the foreign policy making process; individual characteristics, and national & societal characteristics. Research finding of the study aimed to contribute Joko Widodo's personality and its implication toward the making of Global Maritime Fulcrum. Beside that, comprising the societal and national culture of Indonesian people toward the maritime ambition. Internal aspects are the key concept of this theory, in which behavior, culture, and character are the main indicators.

Strategic Culture concept is useful to examine constructed idea of Indonesia's neutrality particularly in the realization of "Maritime State" identity. Through this concept, the research is aimed to be able to capture Indonesian behavior in the current administration. It also helps to understand the process of national identity persistence. Thus, the main focus of the study is to examine 'How has non-alignment foreign policy helps to avoid tensions between Indonesia and China over the South China Sea disputes under President Jokowi's administration?'. The internal aspect will articulate domestic motives supporting foreign policy as a response toward external challenges. Additionally, to gain the understanding of external motives, international approach will be used to clarify interstate relations.

1.4 Research Methodology and Scope

This research will be a descriptive-analytic aimed to result analytic and comprehensive output. The discussion type of the finding is investigation or critical-analysis. Analysis in this research will draw on a two-tiered methodological approach, namely; close textual analysis of primary source material and interpretation of field notes data both through theoretical frameworks. The study is theoretically centered on constructivism approach using strategic culture framework as the new paradigm to examine the case study.

1.4.1 Data Collection

There are two main resources to gain the data in this studies. First, secondary data from the government drafts, official websites, statements, articles, and news articles. To measure the hypotheses, the data such as position paper, keynote speech, presidential, ministerial, and diplomatic speeches will be primary to find conclusion in the study. The official archives will be gained from both the government institutions namely; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Maritime Affairs. Additionally, academic data will be collected from think tank study papers and projects such as Center of Strategy and International Studies (CSIS).

Second, primary data or interview from the foreign policy, South China Sea, and defense experts and government officers as supportive data by describing the empirical information in the field. This data collection is optional, or will be developed if only confirmation is necessary. Interview type developed in this study is unstructured interview requires follow-up question through snowball method. The interview method is in-depth interview processing confidential and intensive information from both scholars and specialists, practitioners and officials. In order to manage the balance of the sources, the institutions related would be; CSIS researcher and strategic policy analyst; Secretary of Directorate General Law and International Agreement of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, DR. Damos Dumoli Agusman.

1.4.2 Scope and Limitation

The scope of the research will be limited by the time period start from the beginning of Global Maritime Strategy enacted in the end of 2014. While the theme scope focused in regards to foreign policy dimension. The case taken in this paper would be the Global Maritime Fulcrum and any actions under the policy.

Strategic Culture concept is relevance to examine the GMF implementation based on the inheritance of “Free and Active” foreign policy. It is namely neutrality idea and identity adopted by President Jokowi in regaining “maritime state” image in the global range. Thus, author will test three basic notions which are national sovereignty, economic benefits, and mediating role.

1.5 Structure of the Thesis

In order to answer research question in this study, the study will gather the finding in three different variables. First, the Chapter 1 contains of introductory context; the issue, theories, and research methodology. Second, Chapter 2 covers the historical background of Indonesian foreign policy and case study, the Global Maritime Fulcrum. The next three chapters will describe finding of three different variables. Chapter 3 portrays Indonesian attempts for protection of national sovereignty includes three sub-sections; new international affairs paradigm, marine resources protection, and military technology advancement. Chapter 4 aims to capture the economic benefits reflection through Economic Diplomacy, personal business attitude, and strengthen Indonesia-China relations. Chapter 5 will clarify Indonesian mediating role in South China Sea disputes in legitimate agreement of Declaration of Conduct and Code of Conduct. Lastly, Chapter 6 will be comprehensive analysis and conclusion.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

This chapter, is written before explanation for the finding, aims to give an explanatory of Indonesian situation begin with the nature of foreign policy to the latest maritime strategy. Thus, detailed explanation is necessary in order to be clear in understanding Indonesian international relations stance. First, “Free and Active” foreign policy as Indonesian foundation in the supervision of foreign relations. Second, given that GMF is taken as case study, it is effective to demonstrate that GMF implementation supposedly based on the “Free and Active” doctrine.

2.1 “Free and Active” Foreign Policy

The importance of “Free and Active” foreign policy is rather comprehensive covering; nation’s doctrine and idea; nation’s stance in international relations; and domestic politics corridor. Its establishment began not long after the declaration of its independence, in 1948, vice president Mohammad Hatta initiated the framework. As a foundation of international relations, the foreign policy is based on neutrality idea. This national substance came from the non-bloc movement in the middle of the Cold War. Hatta believed that Indonesia supposed to concern on its people prosperity rather than two-bloc tensions (U.S. and USSR) (Hatta, 1953, pp. 444-445).

Ideologically, the “Free and Active” mandate is written clearly in the Indonesian Constitution, Undang-undang Dasar 1945 (UUD-45) preamble. It stated that “...ikut melaksanakan ketertiban dunia yang berdasarkan kemerdekaan, perdamaian abadi dan keadilan sosial...” which deliberately mean “...to contribute in the world order based on the independence, enduring peace and social justice...”. Through this foreign policy, Indonesia’s foreign relations designed to avoid any military pact, while it preferably serves national interest. Simultaneously, to cooperate with other states in abolish imperialism and colonialism for the sake of

world peace and stability. Considerably, Indonesia has vigorous role in supporting this neutrality in multilateral way.

There is namely Non-Aligned Movement as a nations commitment to reflect non-bloc act. Non-Aligned Movement is a movement originated firstly in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955 which assembled up 29 countries by the invitation of the Prime Minister of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan. The main interest is focusing prior to developing countries, by mostly former colonies from two continents; Asia and Africa. Those countries concern to develop joint policies particularly in international relations. The meeting was led by Prime Minister Nehru, with Prime Ministers Sukarno, and Nasser discussing the identical problems among Third World states to resist the pressure of the major powers, maintaining the independence, and opposing colonialism and neo-colonialism, mainly western domination. Following the formation, the Cairo preparatory meeting in 1961 conducted to discuss principle aims and objectives of a policy in detail which generated five criteria; i) member state should adopt an independent policy or shows favor of such policy; ii) member state should consistently supporting the Movements for National Independence; iii) member state should not be a member of a multilateral military alliance in the context of Great Power conflicts; iv) if a member state has a bilateral military agreement or pact, it should not deliberately in the context of Great Power conflict; v) if there is a military bases to a Foreign Power the concession should not have been made in the context of Great Power conflicts (The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 2001).

Indonesia was committed for Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) state by its prime minister, Mohammad Hatta in the first Conference of Non-Aligned Heads of State or Government in Belgrade in 1961. The conference initiated by Yugoslavian President Tito purposes a central commitment to be free from the superpower domination especially as a respond to an accelerating arms race in the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States. Alatas mentioned there is *Dasasila* or Ten Principles of international relations which firstly promoted in Asian-African conference in Bandung at 1955 (Alatas, 2001, p. 253). Those Ten Principles are

namely; i) respects for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the charter of the United Nations; ii) respects for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations; iii) recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nation large and small; iv) abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country; v) respects for the right of each nation to defend itself, singly or collectively, in conformity with the charter of the United Nations; vi) a. abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defense to serve any particular interests of the big powers, and b. abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries; vii) refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country; viii) settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of parties own choice, in conformity with the charter of the United Nations; ix) promotion of mutual interests and cooperation; and x) respect for justice and international obligations.

Throughout the time, NAM is the most leading advocate of genuine global interdependence once it served as a pledge toward bipolarize world, is now trying to be an advocate to a global dialogue between North and South. Politically, Indonesia has always played a vital role in the efforts of increasing the role of NAM to encourage peace, international security, dialogue, and cooperation in attempts to address intra and inter conflict through peaceful resolution also efforts in tackling new global issues. NAM member countries have also elected Indonesia as a chair of the Economic and Social Committee, chair of the working group in Disarmament under the Political Committee and member of the Committee of Palestine (Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia).

Thereby, throughout period, “Free and Active” foreign policy has been evolved. Neutrality in Indonesia has been tested by domestic politics itself following the end of Cold War. Sukarno himself had transformed Indonesian political system by his new agenda to submerge Western liberal system in 1957 supported by Hatta’s vision stressed on independence and pragmatism. Furthermore, Sukarno soon in

1959 refused the Liberal Democracy and adopted Guided Democracy as his personal political prompt.

His main approach was radicalized anti-colonialism showed by three main points. First, the winning sovereignty over Irian Jaya in 1962. Second, the opposition effort toward Malay Federation to dismiss the colonial domination in the region. Third, the establishment of Old Established Forces (OLDEFOS) which in regard to “Jakarta-Phnom Penh-Beijing-Pyongyang Axis” aimed to demolish colonial restraint. Sukarno’s anti-colonialism was cultivated more toward communism camp on several important matters. Additionally, this proven by the NAM membership which are communist gained the radical image of the movement especially in the Western perceptions (Anwar, 1994, p. 157). In spite of the radicalized domestic politics during Sukarno’s era, mostly Indonesians are proud of the ‘completion of national integrity through a strong anti-colonialist stance’. (Sukma, 1995, pp. 309-310). Sukarno also radically closing any chance of neo-imperialists and capitalists to enter the country by banning international investors and increasing the tariff barriers on imports caused the economy to its lowest point (Smith, 2000, p. 501).

During Suharto’s administration (1965-1998), Indonesian foreign policy was focused on the maintenance of Jakarta-Kuala Lumpur normalization and the restoration of the ‘original’ ‘free and active’ foreign policy. This is followed by the urgency to endorse foreign policy into Constitution, UUD 1945 and state’s ideology, Pancasila. President Suharto also added one more concept into Indonesian foreign policy to link up internal and external factors, *pembangunan nasional* (national development) interpreted as economic interest. This had been done by securing foreign aid, which as a consequence Indonesia became more tilted toward West. His authoritarian leadership also interrelated toward the conduct of the foreign policy. During his administration Indonesian Military (TNI) playing major role within Department of Foreign Affairs (Deplu) be under it (Smith, 2000, p. 504).

Suharto also was active in realizing Indonesia’s leadership in the Third World association, by facilitating the third anniversary of Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung on April 1985. The reclaim of global issue also shown by leading Non-

Aligned Movement in 1992-95 term. Another maneuver Suharto did was the termination of Indonesia-China bilateral relations regarding to ideology issue. Meanwhile in term of economy, Indonesia pursued intensively on Pan-Pacific economic integration, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) by facilitating Second Leader's Meeting in November 1994. Jakarta's main purpose was to attain free trade area by 2020. (Sukma, *The Evolution of Indonesia's Foreign Policy: An Indonesian View*, 1995, pp. 311-312). Meanwhile looking at the ASEAN roles, Indonesia took regional initiatives such as the one in Cambodia. By signing the agreement of "cocktail party" in 1987, Indonesia succeeded to build the informal forum for four Cambodian factions (Anwar, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy After the Cold War*, 1994, p. 149).

Hence, could be concluded that there was a remarkable transformation in both administrations. Sukarno's administration was centralized by his strong nationalism and ideology which were used for and from internal matters. His leadership was more normative compare to the essential value in 'free and active' foreign policy which are pragmatism and independence. There was a big theme during his administration such as 'Guided Democracy' and anti-western practice. Drastically, right after he stepped down through Suharto's authority or so as called New Order, Indonesian foreign policy began to transform in numerous assertive ways. In the beginning of his leadership, Suharto had managed to put scheme foreign policy into Constitution and state's ideology which basically means return to the essential ideas covering independence and pragmatism. In the implementation, Suharto tends to be more liberal more than Sukarno, in order to reconstruct national economy. His mission is followed by the openness to outside world and active in being a key role in international affairs. In conclusion, compared to Sukarno's administration, Suharto was trying to associate foreign affairs with domestic politics toward the fulfillment of national interest.

By the end of Suharto's regime, Habibie, as he called first 'executive' vice president had been responsible overall affairs such as developing external economic relations and upgrade the science and technological capabilities. After the

fall of Suharto's dictatorship, Habibie's administration (1998-October 1999) tried to formulate contrasting patterns of foreign policy. There were three major standpoints; first, the understanding of 'awakening of nations' have already initiated; second, the concern for responsibilities of human rights and values by both individuals and state, as Suryadinata stated that it followed by the declined military role in the governance (Suryadinata, 1999, p. 116); third, the realization that human race ability to control and develop the power in term physically and non-physically. Beside, President Habibie gained the theory of threat, in correlation with the science and technology. His indulgent towards the country's behavior is identical to the human nature in reacting to the outside threat (Singh, 2000, pp. 237-238).

The massive transformation from the fall of Suharto's regime led to stacks of domestic affairs rather than international. Habibie was challenged with human rights and democracy issue left from the previous administration. In Suharto's regime Chinese ethnic had been marginalized and all the voice had been shut as monitored by the military. In several regions, the rebel and separatist emerged such as East Timor and Aceh. In economic term, Indonesia was in its lowest level of poverty particularly during the last two years of Suharto's administration. By the end of the of 1997, the number of poverty was reached to 72 million and in 1998 it increased to 128 million which was the 65 percent of the population. As a consequence, in the beginning of his administration, Habibie was preoccupied with the domestic affairs which disturb Indonesian foreign relation mainly with neighboring countries such as Malaysia and Singapore (Suryadinata, 1999, p. 124).

Post-authoritarian regimes had gained the emerging democracy. The public opinion was one aspect in shaping foreign policy. For instance, during Abdurrahman Wahid's administration (1999-July 2001) the ruling Parliament was able to oppose the recognition to Israel-Palestine crisis as the result of society concern. He was playing a key role in maintaining Indonesian image in the global arena. His international statesman style is basically emphasizing on the interstate commonalities (Smith, 2000, p. 506). Additionally, Smith also argued that Abdurrahman main concern was to preserve the secular state in which Indonesia

would tend to enter into Islamic Law. Abdurrahman's famous vision of multi-religious and multi-ethnic had pushed the new paradigm toward harmony in the middle of democracy.

Right after the Parliament impeached Gus Dur, Megawati directly managed to fill the president position in 2001. In her hand, Indonesia was focused in building the sub-regional, regional and bilateral cooperation through free trade and private investment. Her vision was rather regionalism than global compared to Abdurrahman's administration. In domestic affairs, her administration was in the transitional phase from the centralized into decentralized. The reformation was not merely on the domestic affairs, in term of foreign policy, Megawati came with the "New Indonesia" in the 21st century (Yani, 2009, p. 11).

Evoking the previous domestic separatism dispute in Aceh and Papua, Megawati attained the peace deal in December 2002 even though it was not the exact peace regarding the following rebel actions in the regions. Megawati's administration also faced the biggest terrorism bombing case in Bali in 12 October 2002 just one year and few weeks after the 9-11 bombing in the United States. Regarding to that, Jakarta started to cooperate closely to Washington especially in military-to-military approach. However, Indonesian stand toward U.S. War on Terror was not fully engaged with Bush's abusive and violent way in attacking Afghanistan and invading Iraq. Megawati's opposition remained obvious regardless the aid of US\$50 million over three years of assistance for Indonesia (Smith, 2003, pp. 103-109)

In the end of her administration, Megawati lost the presidential election against her massive rival, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). Yudhoyono popularity started since he led the growing political party, Partai Demokrat (Democrat Party). As a starter point, Yudhoyono gave his first foreign policy speech in the ICWA, 20 May 2005. There are five key points; first, the constructivist approach is necessarily adopted to maintain interstate relation, mainly to be able to turn for into friend, and friend into partner. He also emphasized on the use of "free and active" position to be active in peacekeeping, confidence building, problem solving, and bridge building mission. Second, Indonesia will not allow the enactment of foreign military base in

Indonesian territory. Third, the maintenance of conducive connection to its neighbors, major powers, and emerging powers, regions of the world, international institutions, and non-state actors. Fourth, the projection of the “free and active” foreign policy should be palpably reflected as Indonesian identity throughout the harmony of democracy, Islam values, and modernity. Lastly, embracing nationalism as the fundamental of internationalism which contains of open, confident, moderate, tolerant, and outward looking (Yani, 2009, pp. 12-13). During his administration, Indonesia seeks international and regional roles in order to be active in engaging and promoting its relations.

As an international statesman, Yudhoyono’s slogan ‘*a thousand friends-zero enemy*’ had been released in January 2010. It pronounces improvements toward bilateral and multilateral cooperation as wide as possible. This comes hand in hand with promoting peace and justice in international sphere and to conduct better investment policy for development, democracy and regional integration, protecting migrant workers and national unity, and implementing more effective foreign policy system. However, the domestic challenge remained stagnant; Aceh, Ambon, Papua, and Maluku conflict.

In some ways, the contemporary foreign policy adopted akin foreign policy framework as in the Sukarno and Suharto’s administration. However, Yudhoyono is more open outward the international organization such as United Nations (UN) and active in the coordinating the NAM. Beside, Indonesia’s contributions in conflicted areas, such as Afghanistan and Iraq showed the legitimacy stance in guiding international peace and justice. Yudhoyono had two tenures in the presidential, he was able to improve his foreign policy mission and vision. In his second tenure, he maintained to prioritized ASEAN leadership through ASEAN+3, ARF, APEC, and Asia Summit (Puspitasari, 2010, pp. 2-4). Beside, SBY initiated massive foreign policy concept to enter larger scope of international affairs. His success footage was the ability to bring Indonesia as the only Southeast Asian countries to join G20. Indonesia also was active with global challenge such as climate-change

prevention and deepening democratic values in developing countries (Thalang, 2016, p. 55).

2.2 Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF)

By the end of SBY administration, Joko Widodo or preferably called as Jokowi elected as a new president in 2014. Since he came to power, Indonesian foreign politics concern has undergone fundamental changes. Jokowi's political journey started since his political success as a mayor in Surakarta. Through his ability to manage the city, he had been known by Indonesian society widely. This brought him to the governor election and led to political success as governor of Jakarta which next took him to the presidential palace in the 2014 direct elections endorsed by Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). Jokowi's story has been intriguing as he came from non-political background. Before entering governmental position, he was a successful businessman in Surakarta.

During Jokowi's presidential inauguration speech in October 2014, he propelled Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) as his main concern for the next five-years administration. To be clear and exact, the strategy is rather a new vision acquired by state leader, meanwhile, its implementation has to be under the "Free and Active" corridor. Its nature, in regard to foreign policy, is the need to engage with the outside world. Thus, "Free and Active", consistently, is persisted in the current administration.

The Global Maritime Fulcrum is firstly propelled in Naypyidaw, Myanmar in November 13th 2014 during ASEAN Summit in front of international audience. Jokowi's ambition to regain Indonesia's image as a 'maritime state' with the ancient maritime refrain "*Jalesveva Jayamahe*" means "victorious in the sea". The long-standing motivation mainly during the *Majapahit* and *Srivijaya* kingdom whereas the culture is strong-related to Indonesian maritime power. In its implementation it will regulate the IUU fishing (Illegal, Unregulated, and Unreported fishing), overfishing,

naval upgrade, EEZ optimization, coastal shipping, and to develop Asia-Pacific maritime power alliance (Nainggolan, 2015, pp. 172-173).

The content of GMF is complex and explicit to maritime concerns; maritime culture, marine resources protection, maritime security, maritime diplomacy, and maritime connectivity. First, maritime culture aimed to revolve Indonesian maritime idea and image as reflection of main identity, prosperity, and future. Second, the commitment to protect and manage marine resources and sovereignty, particularly in fisheries sector. Third, this pillar is focused on infrastructure development and connectivity by constructing sea toll, port, logistic, and ship industry as well as maritime tourism. Fourth, maritime diplomacy includes invites inclusive partnership in maritime affairs. Fifth, located in between two important oceans, Pacific and Indian, Indonesia is obliged to build solid maritime security capacity (PresidenRI.go.id, 2015).

Even though GMF covers comprehensive aspect in maritime, domestic economy constrains as dominant attempt. As Conelly mentioned him rather as domestic reformer than international statesman, Jokowi strategy is to develop internal affairs first before entering international affairs (2014, pp. 5-6). However, there are four main components of his overall foreign policy agenda; First, promoting Indonesia's identity as an archipelagic state. Second, enhancing the global role of middle power diplomacy. Third, Expanding engagement in the Indo-Pacific region. Fourth, further reform of the foreign ministry to emphasize economic diplomacy (Márton, 2015, p. 32). In this matter, maritime sector is located as top priority. Specifically, on January 8th 2015, Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi mentioned that Indonesia foreign policy priorities are "maintaining Indonesia's sovereignty, enhancing the protection of Indonesian citizens, and intensifying economic diplomacy". At some consequences, these foreign policy framework have focused on the protecting Indonesia's interests yet displeasing regional neighbors such as China and Australia (Thalang, 2016, p. 2). Furthermore, it is not impossible to be strangled by parliamentary and domestic politics rivalry.

2.3 Conclusion

The GMF is historical product which initiated in a new approach by Jokowi. Indonesian identity as “Maritime State” is not a new idea. The genuine identity had been found and constructed in the Sukarno’s era. During the kingdom period, Indonesia had started its maritime power through kingdom; *Majapahit* and *Sriwijaya*. This glory then continued after the independence era by Sukarno, the founding father and first president by adopting the national image of powerful maritime throughout historical articulation. Sukarno’s well-known Sanskrit phrase “*Jalesveva Jayamahe*” was a national campaign to articulate Indonesian victory in the sea.

Jokowi’s administration is trying to regain the spirit of “Maritime State” identity no merely in domestic scope but globally. In this matter, important for current administration to be based on with the withstanding of Indonesian neutrality as written in “Free and Active” doctrine. For both foreign policy and maritime vision is closely linked specifically in conducting international relations.

CHAPTER 3

JOKO WIDODO'S ATTEMPTS TO PROTECT INDONESIAN SOVEREIGNTY

This chapter is focused on Joko Widodo's agenda particularly in securing Indonesian sovereignty. The aspect behind this action is protecting national territory and echoing maritime capacity advancement without any offensive signal to South China Sea disputants, especially China. This significant is mainly to reflect Indonesian identity and image as "Maritime State" without confronting the tensions in Natuna Islands. There are three sub-parts as evidences; first, new international affairs paradigm describes national leader's style and strategy in spreading the message regarding to foreign affairs. Second, marine resources protection explains Jokowi's concern on marine and fisheries stocks, this is aimed to boost Indonesian maritime potencies. Third, military advancement, specifically in maritime security fields, is functioned to strengthen Indonesian maritime security in the borderline.

3.1 New International Affairs Paradigm

This section of finding would descriptively explain personal adoption in the GMF implementation. The study of Strategic Culture is taking a persona as a keeper into account. In this regard, national leader is relevant to carry national strategy. Throughout deep investigation, there are points matter to the establishment of foreign affairs. In one side, there is more flexibility in engaging interstate cooperation, meanwhile, there is a sense of getting firmer toward national sovereignty protection.

Joko 'Jokowi' Widodo's strategy maneuver has been challenging yet attractive. His lack of knowledge in the international affairs, does not determine his ability to put the right man in the right place had been resulting glance by glance of success. Global Maritime Fulcrum is a complex idea of overall a nation's strategy covering both domestic and international affairs formulated precisely to attain both at the same time. Generally, Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi engaged more definite

foreign policy for the five years with critical to advocate Indonesian sovereignty, protection for citizen overseas, and employing down-to-earth economic diplomacy (Christanto & Saragih, 2015). In the domestic domain, Jokowi had been succeeded to gain positive public opinion and respond. While in the international arena, his vision engrossed various reactions.

In the following inauguration, President Jokowi had announced his new maritime strategy, Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF). Throughout his first speech in the inauguration in Nusantara Building, Monday October 20 2014, he mentioned several main points (Detiknews, 2017). There was full of new captivating strategy shown as; First, the ambition to bring out a synergy covering all elements of the state to work together. His well-known catch phrase '*kerja, kerja, dan kerja!*' which means "to work, work, and work" has led to the understanding for endless productivity. Second, he also shortly stated his concern on maritime affairs and intention to restore the maritime state identity. The old Sanskrit phrase used by President Sukarno, "*Jalesveva Jayamahe*" which means "victorious in the sea" been cited in the speech as fundamental introductory. Third, he touched the "Free and Active" foreign policy and its continuance would be well-kept during his administration. This foreign policy should be able to articulate national interest as well as to contribute to global peace and social justice maintenance based on the frame of independence. Fourth, President Jokowi quoted Sukarno's statement which basically means "in order to build a strong, peaceful, and prosper nation, we should have the *cakrpati*h spirit meaning the bravery, and courage to wade through the rolling waves.". Jokowi closed the speech with the analogy of the state as a ship and himself as the captain directed to invite entire components of the state as a united power to face any challenges.

Accordingly, that starting point showed combination of personal style and historical values; Indonesian Free and Active behavior and archipelagic visions. Moreover, there were few actors that also involved behind GMF. This form of team was trying to find the loophole from the opponent's campaign and program. Thus, Joko Widodo's administration features are intriguingly differing to his predecessors'.

As Syailendra mentioned that the nature of maritime strategy was part of campaign strategy which Jokowi and his team, Rizal Sukma (Foreign Affairs observer) and Andi Widjajanto (Jokowi's team) framed to counter his opponent, Prabowo, who was more concentrated in land affairs such as agriculture sector (Syailendra, 2017). This sophisticated concept was achieved bring the victory for Jokowi, General Election Agency (KPU) noted that Jokowi gained 53.15% over Prabowo 46.85% of the total result (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, 2014).

Meanwhile, in the international sphere, several scholars analyzed that Jokowi's strategy using GMF gained various responds from other states, especially hegemony in the region. During the Second ASEAN-US Summit meeting in Naypyidaw, Myanmar on Thursday November 13 2014, for the first time, he announced his new maritime vision. His emphasize goes to the presenting Indonesia as one of the powerful maritime nation. Jokowi addressed his main objective in placing maritime affairs as *"Thus, as a maritime country, Indonesia should assert itself as the World Maritime Axis. This position opens opportunity for Indonesia to develop regional and international cooperation for the prosperity of the people,"* (Witular, 2014).

Due to increase its maritime existence specifically in Indian and Pacific Ocean, Indonesia obligated to build its maritime power in order to take responsibility for safeguarding safety and maritime security. Andi Widjajanto stressed on maritime security which would be a collaboration of the coast guard and the Navy, directed to *"...increase in the number of patrol and battleships."* (Witular, 2014).

Scholars such as Connelly (2014), Thalang (2016), and Sambhi (2015) interpreted that Jokowi's ambition, especially in maritime affairs could be tangled by hegemony in the region, especially the main player, China. This is due to the lack of personal and political experiences to the international affairs (Connelly, Indonesian Foreign Policy under President Jokowi, 2014, pp. 3-4), various issues regarding to sovereignty protections which could impact its international affairs (Thalang, 2016, p. 59), and global reactions toward its reactive actions to protect its territory and natural resources (Sambhi, Jokowi's 'Global Maritime Axis': Smooth Sailing or Rocky Seas Ahead?, 2015, p. 54). There are some strategic responses to open more

cooperation, however there are some clashes on the other side. In the early 2016, China protested Indonesia's seizure of Chinese vessel *Gui Bei Yu* in Natuna Islands for its illegal fishing activities in Natuna waters. China said that the vessel was transporting normal activities in its fishing ground (ABC News, 2016). It is clear that there was a different understanding between Indonesia and China to pinpoint the Natuna waters issue. Whilst Indonesia was starting to send a global signal to other state in regard to border and territory protection, China, which claimed the traditional fishing ground, would likely be the one reacting Indonesia's firmer way in the border.

Jokowi's style in marine resources protection is not aggressively echoed contains of condemnations, intimidations, or sort. He has calm persona, which people might think he does not know much in defense and security matters. Hence, he has rare way in representing Indonesian stance toward the sovereignty safeguard. Conversely, the response given as a result of Beijing's claims over Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as China's "traditional fishing ground" in northern Natuna Islands in the beginning of 2016 was quite a revelation. It is because his rare visit in June 2016 did not sound like a challenging China, instead, he was focused on the economic potential of the Natunas during the team meeting held on board the naval warship. There was an effort of being more assertive in upholding its sovereignty without intimidating the regional hegemon, China (Soeriaatmadja, 2016). Agusman, furthermore, mentioned that there were no longer tensions lasted between Indonesia and China. Post-tensions in 2016, Indonesia managed to maintain its good relations with China.

The GMF is not limited in opening the opportunities to intensify interstate cooperation, regardless. Even though the tensions between China and Indonesia arose caused by some incidents have happened in Natuna waters, Indonesia-China relations does not seem to be intruded at some points. Two giant countries have quite enthusiastic in cooperating with Indonesia, China and the U.S. was signaling significant opportunity to engage with Indonesia new maritime vision. Jokowi's maritime strategy is best fit to ascend Indonesia-U.S. relations from "comprehensive

partnership” into “comprehensive strategic partnership”. this means that the relations have reached the level of Indonesia-China relations. However, the cooperation were limited in segmented fields, with the U.S., Indonesia deepen the investment in technology as well as covered in the security sphere; maritime security and counterterrorism. Whereas, Sino-Indonesia partnership focused on maritime field in fostering the infrastructure and economic deals (Quirk & Bradford, 2015). Notably, the accelerated interstate cooperation is without the intention of intervening tensions in Natuna waters. Agusman mentioned that *“there is no escalation of domination from the superpowers, Indonesian relation to both China and the U.S. is in a neutral position. We cooperate with the U.S. regardless the case in Natuna. This cooperation designed to counteract China’s behavior in Natuna.”* (Agusman, 2017).

Protecting Indonesian migrant workers also in the main agenda of Jokowi’s administration. As the home of 250 million populations, Indonesia has sent 700,000 documented migrant workers every year to work in East, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. Totally there are 4.3 million documented Indonesian migrant workers currently overseas (Wardah, 2015). In the beginning of his administration, Jokowi has prioritized to dispatch Indonesian migrant workers and provide decent work for the citizens. This is emerged as a solution toward abuse, death penalty, and exploitation cases, especially to female migrant workers (The Jakarta Post, 2015). In order to enhance the protections for its migrant workers, Indonesia puts more attention in two conditions before sending off migrant workers overseas; country destination has a national legislation that guarantees the protection of foreign migrant workers, and country signed the bilateral agreement that guarantee of protection of Indonesian migrant workers (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015).

The following foreign policy also ultimate to economic sector as to intensify the economic diplomacy. This diplomacy is basic to expand Indonesian economic agenda covering: (i) the protection of marine resources, (ii) developing infrastructure and connectivity, (iii) continuance of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), (iv) trade protection from unfair allegations, and (v) food and energy independency (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). It is obvious that Jokowi placed definite and

intensive economic concern in his foreign policy framework. As a domestic reformer, he apprehended economic development is pivotal and complex. It could be concluded that Jokowi is using the integrated idea of maritime strategy to prioritize sovereignty, sustainability, and welfare.

Additionally, President Jokowi also directly conveyed the openness of Indonesia toward Foreign Direct Investment, and trade, generally in economic opportunities and specifically in implementing ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). His concern on expanding Indonesian economy through freer market and investment opportunity was delivered in a *'blak-blakkan'* (straightforward) diplomacy. Nevertheless, this desire redirected without neglecting national interest by *"Indonesia under my administration is open to business. But Indonesia, like other sovereign nations, must ensure that no harm comes to our national interest....Indonesia will not allow itself to become merely a market."* (The Jakarta Post, 2014).

Overall, there is a new unique pattern brought in dealing with international affairs, which Agusman mentioned "as long as" in the Jokowi's style. This means there is a remarkable shift in international affairs from Yudhoyono's *"thousand friends, zero enemy"* replaced to Jokowi's *"we are all friends, as long as there is no disturbance to our (Indonesian) territory"* (Agusman, 2017). Agusman believes that there is a sense of being assertive in Jokowi's way especially in protecting state sovereignty while in the other side being more open. He raised his analysis that *"This approach might look like an anomaly as realist called as ambiguity, while for me, it is not, because it is the extension of the Jokowi's 'as long as' way"* (Agusman, 2017).

In sum, both domestic and international responses toward Jokowi's approach are in favor to his administration. In domestic arena, he used new approach in gaining political will throughout straight-forwardness and humble personality. Meanwhile, in international sphere, Joko Widodo is applying the "Flexible engagement and strong fencing" approach. Flexible and openness are expressed by wider and deeper range of interstate cooperation. While strong fencing is proper to

border issue, particularly with neighboring countries; Malaysia and Singapore. Besides, current foreign policy has also been focused in protecting Indonesian migrant workers. Given the negative response from China over incidents in Natuna waters, Indonesia remains to gain significant responses especially in maritime affairs cooperation. This indicates the formulation of personal approach in carrying national visions in protecting the sovereignty without extreme protectionism.

3.2 Marine Resources Protection

Moving toward the marine resource protection, this section would primarily focus on how Joko Widodo's strategy in "putting the right man in the right place". It is not surprising that the person behind ship-sinking is aggressive and straight to the point. Susi Pudjiastuti is important person to be in the frame of GMF implementation, in which her concern in protecting Indonesian marine resources has been accomplished by coordinating military with ministerial entities. In Lantis emphasize on elites' role in Strategic Culture, in this realm, Jokowi's maritime vision has been enhanced by important persona under his cabinet.

Marine resources protection to support the sustainability was rooted from the awareness of IUU (Illegal, Unregulated, and Unreported) fishing that have been depleting Indonesian fish stocks. This practice has impacted to national economic loss for up to 20 billion dollars per year, destructed 65% of coral reefs, 85% of global fish stocks. In her speech, November 16 2015, Minister Susi Pudjiastuti described her concern in the eradication of IUU fishing. She started with imposing moratorium for ex-foreign vessels and conduct compliance audit on approximately 1,200 vessels. This effort also simultaneously supported by banning transshipment and the use of unsustainable fishing gears. The institution does not work alone on this behalf, there are Task Force on Prevention and Eradication of IUU Fishing, Ministry of Transportation, Police, the Navy, Coast Guards, Tax Administration Office, Customs Office, Financial Intelligence unit, and other relevant agencies to work under her command (Pudjiastuti, 2015). Additionally, Susi also appointed to lead the *ad*

hoc agency, Task Force 115 to monitor any Maritime Security Patrol activities (Syailendra, 2017).

In some strategic and risky waters, Susi placed more patrol as she mentioned that *“We were helped by the Indonesian Military and National Police in sinking the vessels in 12 locations. They are Aceh; Ambon and Ternate in Maluku; Bali, Belawan in Medan, North Sumatra; Bitung, North Sulawesi; Merauke, Papua; Natuna and Tarempa in Riau Islands; Pontianak, West Kalimantan; Sorong, West Papua; and Tarakan in North Kalimantan,”* (The Jakarta Post, 2017). The Jakarta Post noted that on April 2017 there were 81 more vessels sunk in Morela Beach in Ambon by from the ministry’s illegal fishing prevention task force, and other authorities on fishing territories across Indonesia with full commando via a video conference call and live streaming (The Jakarta Post, 2017).

Regarding to the complexity of the vision, this pivot actions could possibly cause some overlaps and clashes between or among the government institutions. The working area would require three vital institutions; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Ministry of Defense, and Indonesian Army (Tentara Republik Indonesia-TNI). Syailendra stated there are 12 maritime security agencies involved in the implementation of GMF has caused overlap jurisdiction because of institutional ‘ego’ and differ ideas. Due to this debates, Jokowi installed some neutral figures to reduce internal tensions such as Luhut Pandjaitan and Wiranto to facilitate inter-institutions communications (Syailendra, 2017).

To conclude, the strategy of “putting the right man in the right place” has been tested by the civil-military relations. In this regard, interior maintenance is crucial to be maintain to avoid inter-institutions clash. Currently, Jokowi has faced several internal dynamics in his governance personnel. However, there is no significant disruption affecting its external affairs.

3.3 Military Technology Advancement

This part of the finding will expose Indonesian military advancement attempts in regard to GMF. This covers both hardware and software, also involving national and international reach. In the previous section, the personnel approach is taken into account, while non-political institution; military is also important in this matter. Military institutions required to be accountable in order to respond to GMF.

Global Maritime Fulcrum derives Indonesian defense posture to be more 'powerful'. This is intensely paramount to maritime sector. In the following late 2015, Parameswaran wrote that proposal to intensify defense budget has been signed by the House of Representatives (DPR). Principal to that, Mahfudz Siddiq, the Chairman of Commission I of the House of Representatives, agreed in the proposal propositioned by the Defense Minister, Ryamizard Ryacudu of Rp 37 trillion military budget intensification. This would be allocated mainly for new equipment purchase; navy and air hardware (Parameswaran, *The Diplomat*, 2015).

The significant concerns also specified by military side, which General Gatot Nurmantyo stated "*To build maritime fulcrum, we need to be advance in navy and air...*". This could be presumed that reallocation targeted by Ministry of Defense as a consideration in responding the tensions in Natuna waters. The government appointed territorial priorities in dealing with gas stock protection and 'fencing' Papua. Simultaneous step had taken in 2015 to aggregate inclusive maritime security. In the eastern part, Masela Block in Arafura Sea which located between Papua and Australia contains of 15, 22 trillion cubic feet of gas stock. Whilst, in Lanal Sorong, West Papua, government strengthen naval base. This is because the area is vulnerable conflict from separatist group, as well as to escalate the security in international route (Kusumadewi, Utama, Pratama, & Sarwanto, 2015).

Based on the Indonesian Defense White Paper (2015), the development of the national defense posture is directed to improve the defense capability covering the military and non-military defense towards regional maritime power with defensive active principles (Defence Ministry of the Republic of Indonesia, 2015).

Minimum Essential Force (MEF) is a long-term defense policy leads to ideal posture of Indonesian Military covering military equipment modernization, maintenance, organization development and facilities fulfillment supported by professionalism and industry ability as well as to develop prosperity. Besides, the target of Indonesian security policy is the technology advancement by the usage of satellite and drones. Furthermore, to implement Minimum Essential Force (MEF) in 2015-2019, Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) prioritizes in battleship procurement. Indonesian Navy aimed to attain the World Class Navy vision throughout advancement of naval hardware. Organizational approach also required to be more integrated, transparent, and efficient. This MEF strategy had been suited to “Alutsista” (Weaponry System) (Kementerian Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, 2016). To project its military advancement, Jokowi planned to boost military budget for nearly \$7 billion in 2014 and \$20 billion by 2020 (Quirk & Bradford, 2015). Hence, Indonesia confirmed to procure 11 Russian-made Sukhoi, Su-35S ‘Flanker-E’ multirole fighter jets for Indonesian Air Force (TNI-AU) (Gady, 2017).

In the domestic range, Indonesia is building its armada, especially in certain critical spot. Meanwhile, internationally, Indonesia made clear to any interstate cooperation as stated in the Defense White Paper (2015) intended to improve defense cooperation between bilateral and multilateral, which refers to a foreign policy; non-aligned, and strengthens its identity as the archipelago and maritime nation. Cooperation is developed to build Confidence Building Measures (CBM), capacity building, participated in world peace, education and training, as well as diplomatic efforts through strategic partnership based on government policy (Defence Ministry of the Republic of Indonesia, 2015)

Indonesia engaged with strategic partners from Asia and Pacific countries. It had managed to engaged closer ties the U.S. facilitated by President Jokowi’s official visit to Washington in October 25-28 2015. Even though the naval cooperation is not a new, but the visit had succeeded to elevate Indonesia-U.S. cooperation from “comprehensive partner” into “comprehensive strategic partner”. The cooperation is aligned with maritime and counterterrorism challenges throughout joint exercise and

capacity building programs to increase investment in Indonesian maritime security (Quirk & Bradford, 2015). The cooperation is based on the shared vision for maintaining peaceful and prosperous environment at sea.

Even though Indonesia-U.S. naval cooperation is not new, the newest cooperation framework comprises more intensive contents to maritime security. For instance, Sea Surveillance Exercise carried out the Navy was targeted to boost the security in Malacca Strait and Natuna Islands to monitor the busiest sea lanes of the world shipping and flight activities. The exercise was held in April 9-10 2015 was involving 88 personnel and four air fleets carried out from Batam to Natuna in the Riau Islands (Fadli, 2015). Furthermore, regarding to the bilateral exercise between Indonesian and the U.S, Rear Adm. Brian Hurley, commander, Task Force 73 mentioned that *“Our shared interest in maritime security is what CARAT is all about – and it’s allowed our navies to develop a sustained and growing partnership that benefits both countries.”*. Indonesia and the U.S. has done CARAT (Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training) since 1995. After setting the same maritime mission, the cooperation planned to do diverse exercise for 2016 to strengthen interoperability in ashore training and warfare areas to assure the readiness in time of crisis (Task Force 73 Public Affairs, 2016).

With Japan, Indonesia had signed the memorandum between both Defense Ministry in March 23 2015 in defense fields. Even though it is not legally binding, there are ten points of scope of cooperation and exchange stresses on capacity building, exchange information on defense institutions, education and training and promotion on defense substitute (Ministry of Defense, 2015). This is compatible to Japanese concern in filling the gap after the U.S. declining influence in Southeast Asia. Japan is more likely to be more active in Southeast Asia, especially in assisting the maritime fields with ASEAN disputant states regarding to South China Sea. The following states are Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines and strategic in maritime defense cooperation.

Japan military role in Southeast Asia expanded by the sales of defense equipment. Hideaki Watanabe, the Defense Minister, implied that this strategy is a

reaction from tensions in South China Sea. To scale up the defense industry, in 2017 Japan projected to boost its defense budget to more than 10 billion yen (US\$90 million) (Associated Press, Reuters, 2017). Japan-Indonesia relations escalated in December 2016 marked by the Indonesia-Japan Maritime Forum to discuss maritime cooperation. Japan would likely assist Indonesia in developing ports, developing remote islands, and the enhancement of maritime security (Ikeda, 2016).

Indonesia-Australia relations has been dynamic through times, since Indonesia's independence. However, it could be said that Australia has a great role for Indonesian geographical contiguous. Lombok Treaty (Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and Australia on the Framework for Security Cooperation) completed in 2006 as the milestone between both states. The cooperation framework covers the defense, law enforcement, counterterrorism, intelligence, maritime safety and aviation security, prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, emergency response, international organizations related to security issues, as well as an increased understanding between communities and between individuals. The cooperation then extended through Indonesia-Australia Defense Strategy Dialogue (IADSD), Australia-Indonesia High Level Committee (HLC Ausindo), and the Two Plus Two between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defense Minister between both countries (Defence Ministry of the Republic of Indonesia, 2015).

Preferably, both states are having a role to fill the 'gaps' after the superpower (the U.S) withdrew its massive role in Asia. Since the victory of Donald Trump in presidential election raises serious changes in Asia's security pattern. Trump's ide on putting "America First" has weakened the security commitment in Asia, especially 'rebalancing' concept. With the raise of China, its financial muscles and reclamation of artificial islands in the South China Sea, the regional changes would face toward critical phase. There are at least four engagements for Australia and Japan to maintain the regional stability and order: 1) they must continue to assurance and commitment to liberal international order, especially in Asia-Pacific region; 2) Australia and Japan should deepen their defense and security cooperation both bilateral and trilateral with the U.S in areas of: military trainings/exercise and

interoperability; information/intelligence-sharing; missile defense; cyber and space security and; regional defense engagement, especially in Southeast Asia; 3) Japan should also continue and accelerate its security reform, including the implementation of new security legislation, which came into effect in March 2016 at the same time, Australian government should encourage Japan's continuous efforts for security reform; 4) both Japan and Australia should seek to expand their cooperation with democratic countries such as South Korea and India in order to counterbalance the growing Chinese influence (Satake, 2017).

Above those all, Indonesia, as a 'free and active' state, should not have more than a cooperation in term of military and defense to keep the neutral stance as its reputation. The close and closer relations to superpowers above has not change the status in South China Sea dispute, particularly in Natuna Islands. Indonesia would also make sure that non-disputant would bring the message that Indonesia is challenging China in Natuna. Agusman stated that, the strategic cooperation with the U.S. would not have any cross-relation with tensions in Natuna waters. This is because the U.S. would not like to diametrically opposed China through Indonesia (Agusman, 2017). In conclusion, the intensive cooperation with whoever states, it is not aimed to intrude China in Natuna waters, so to speak, with or without China and tensions in Natuna waters, Indonesia will be active seek for maritime cooperation.

Intriguingly, Indonesia's behavior is not limited in this circumstance. On the other side, President Jokowi is actively build closer economic ties with China. At last, Jokowi is constructing economic power and flexing Indonesian military muscles simultaneously and slowly to avoid security dilemma and assertive movement. To conclude, military enhancement is significant to support the maritime visions. This effort is less to sending signal for arms race and more to support the interior capability in articulating maritime power as stated in national idea and identity.

3.4 Conclusion

To conclude this chapter, it is important to describe nation's approach in the first attempt; national sovereignty protection. This first finding found that there is involvedness among leader's approach, internal government politics, and foreign relations in signifying national sovereignty protection.

First, given that national leader's role is crucial to express national strategy, Jokowi's preferences and approaches are helpful to shape nation's behavior in international affairs. Author has identified that there is intersection in between "flexible engagement" and "strong fencing". As explained, even though there is a conduct of wide-open foreign relations, on the other side, there is a strong foundation in securing national territory and assets.

Second, domestic politics dynamic is presumably existing in the administration. In political realm, it is hard to separate both domestic and foreign politics. In Indonesia's case, author has founded that inter-institutions clashed existed, for instance the clatters among personnel in the cabinet. However, those are insignificantly affecting national strategy to the outside world.

Third, from the international relation perspective, author has recognized that nation's strategy in sovereignty protection leads to wider interstate cooperation. The evidences are strained from various deeper and new partnerships with potential powers; Japan, the U.S., Australia. Jokowi's administration is likely adapting flexible and open opportunity to other states as a support to be more capable in bolstering maritime posture.

Overall, Indonesian strategy culture is aimed to strengthen its border and intensify the flexibility of foreign affairs. National idea and identity of "Maritime State" is underlying the national sovereignty protection strategy. However, regarding incidents in Natuna Islands, Jokowi is avoiding to carry up the tensions with China.

CHAPTER 4

JOKO WIDODO REFLECTS ECONOMIC BENEFITS

In order to counterbalance domestic and international affairs, there is a specific demand for Indonesia to manage between pragmatic interest and philosophical identity. This chapter will mention some aspects related to Indonesia's strategy to construct Indonesian "Maritime State" without degrading attention to its domestic interest. There is a significant notion of fostering infrastructure through both land and sea and link it to international affairs in which coherent with China's economy and connectivity initiatives. Whereby, personal adaptation and adaptation in the current administration is also important to be captured in interpreting Indonesia's strategy.

4.1 Economic Diplomacy

Indonesian foreign policy advances economic development by Economic Diplomacy. In this section, author found three substantial economic strategies. Presumably, Jokowi's strategy is centered on the problem-roots of Indonesian economic or so called New Developmentalism. In order to clearly understand the problem, this section will illustrate a bottom-up linkages starting from; securing national assets by tax amnesty, fostering connectivity, and attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).

Jokowi administration is full of economic transform yielded as the main component of nation's urgency. Economic approach is invented in the Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF). The country resources and capability is granted to economic improvement. Meanwhile, corruption and lack of management hamper the state ability in order to reform and reconstruct it. As a successful businessman, Jokowi is bringing the sense of resource management and understand the 'problem roots'. During the 24th World Economic Forum on East Asia, Jokowi stated that *"Today, we must shift from consumption back to production...to investment in our*

infrastructure, investment in our industry, but most importantly, investment in our human capital, the most precious resource of the 21st century.” (Tay, 2016, p. 1).

Following the enactment of GMF, President Jokowi started his approach to meet national interest. Thereby, economic diplomacy is supreme in Jokowi's foreign policy framework. To mark the domestic economic revolution, Ministry of Finance launched the “tax amnesty” in order to reserve national assets. This national scale program is allocated to support Jokowi's ambition in fostering infrastructure. In March 2017, the agenda has been succeeding to collect 745,000 taxpayers declaring more than \$330 billion of assets, which manifested as the world's most successful tax amnesty. Minister Sri Mulyani has a Tax Reform Team employed 38,000 workers to collect taxes in 2016. The minister aims to increase tax ratio to 15% of GDP which now is 11% (Ismoyo, 2017).

Jokowi's economic push is complex in a sense that Indonesia should be more efficient to discover national ‘leaks’ and/or ‘hidden’ assets. The country is home for almost 260 million inhabitants while only 10% has been registered as taxpayers, it leads to immense deficit which burden the development of infrastructure (Varagur, 2017). This clearly integrated to international economic deals which demands Indonesia to have better and more sufficient access in advance. In regard to that, Jokowi had started in his first day of his terrane. There are massive national scale infrastructure projects; to connect Indonesia from west to the east. He realized that connectivity is one of the obstacle of economic reformation and development.

As the most populated country in the Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia started to flex its economic muscles. During Jokowi's administration, Indonesia seems more open for free trade and FDI. There are 14 economic policy package to carry, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs is a part of the Task Force Group I especially in dealing with campaign and disseminate economic policy in the Task Force for the Acceleration and Effectiveness of Economy Policy Implementation. In 2016, there were 149 bilateral and multilateral agreements in the field of economy have been agreed. In that year, also remarked the EU FLEGT-VPA License for

Indonesian timbers. The recognition also ease the access of air flight to European Union countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Indonesia, 2017). Furthermore, in the beginning of 2017, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Bank Indonesia (Bank of Indonesia) teamed up for economic diplomacy by “*strengthen cooperation amid growing dynamic challenges facing Indonesia in international cooperation.*” (Tang, 2017).

It is noted that Jokowi pledged economic reforms through his contentious power in the representative; protectionism and nationalism. Warburton stated that Jokowi has brought the ‘new developmentalism’ into an account throughout narrow pragmatic economy programs which full clarity especially in building infrastructure, deregulation, and de-bureaucratization (Warburton, 2016, p. 298). Hence, policymakers should consider the regional and trade economic integration to ease trade connectivity. Indonesia must pace up its networks to key export markets. Furthermore, to engage more with ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and immediately negotiate to Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements (CEPAs) with the EU and Australia. Within the key sectors; Information and Communications Technology (ICT), real estates, and manufacture industry to lure in the investment (Tay, 2016, pp. 14-15). The recent survey noted since 2012, startup investment in the e-commerce categories accounts for 58%, while transportation has 38%. The growth is doubled from 2016 which was \$1.4 billion and surged to \$3 billion by August 2017 (Tempo.co, 2017).

4.2 Personal Business Attitude

In the significance of Strategic Culture, it is important to capture leader’s personality and style. This point is important to identify who is the nation’s strategic culture keeper, moreover, how he/she will articulate the national interest in front domestic and international audience. In this section, author found two interesting of Jokowi’s leader characters; first, he is rather pragmatic over normative; second, straight forward and simple.

As one of the diplomacy products, Global Maritime Fulcrum is complex combination of geopolitics, geo-economics, geo-cultures, and historical. It is not partial to sea tact but also concealing the entire idea of economic, security, and diplomacy. This platform is used to interpret Indonesia's movement in both internal and external. In its application is not surprising to assume that Jokowi tends to be more pragmatic than his predecessors. He has lack of politics and diplomacy experiences although his successful business track may be more straight forward in interpreting national interests.

This is a unique way to enlarge Jokowi's way in expelling national interest with his own way. Compare to his predecessors, Jokowi takes pragmatic way and less normative. Indonesia's domestic politics expert perceived that even though almost of presidents' foreign policy is the extension of domestic politics and national interest, however Jokowi is more likely pragmatic. His foreign policy is focused mainly to attract economic cooperation especially investment. Compared to Yudhoyono with his big ideas, Jokowi prefers to give more flexibility to Foreign Minister Retno, Luhut, and his team to take charge in foreign affairs. Syailendra also classified that there are three characteristics in Jokowi's foreign affairs; i) rely in a lot of individual in his cabinet to connect and in charge in international affairs; ii) more focused in economic policy and courting investment; iii) less concern about 'big ideas' such as Korean issues (Syailendra, 2017).

Jokowi's pragmatic way also expressed in any diplomatic, ministerial, and presidential visits. In the interview, Agusman stated that Jokowi always make use of good relations to achieve national interest. Similar to Syailendra, he emphasized that Jokowi is not into being an international statesman to be international 'hero'. In each of occasions, there will be a first question of 'what will the agenda benefit Indonesia?'. Foreign Minister Retno, in accordance, always carry the 'down to earth' diplomacy pattern particularly in echoing economic diplomacy (Agusman, 2017).

Beside economic gain, Jokowi also focused on how the interstate relation could bring Indonesia to have a higher status in International affairs. His persona manages to spread the message that in the international environment, Indonesia is

neutral. For example, his visit to Turkey on July 5-6 2017 was not merely to show the Muslim solidarity, but also to gain Turkey support for Indonesia in United Nations Security Council (UNSC) candidacy. Besides, the visit generated two agreements; health care and the launch of negotiations to establish an Indonesian-Turkish Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) (News Desk, 2017). On the other side, during the visit of King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud to Indonesia on March 2017, Jokowi was showing domestic and international environment that Indonesia's stance is neutral between the tensions of Turkey and Saudi Arabia. In both occasions, Jokowi humbly recorded himself with both leaders in an informal way or known as 'vlogging' (video-blogging) (Agusman, 2017). This automatically calls the global attention in which how a president uses an unusual approach to gain the political image.

Jokowi's persona is full of simplicity but straight to the point of how he could carry out national interest. He prefers to not complicate international affairs and start in a clean slate for managing development. This could be seen to what extent Indonesia remains stable in engaging deeper economic cooperation with any states unexceptionally with China, which incidentally there is tensions with Indonesia in Natuna waters. The next part would discuss how Indonesia is intensively increase the economic cooperation with the hegemon of the region.

4.3 Indonesia-China Relation

Indonesia-China economic relation is not new, it started since the normalization after Indonesian crisis in 1965. China has been a major contributor of trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) for Indonesia and now it's projected to be even stronger. However, regarding current Indonesian top priority in fostering connectivity, China has been strongly involved. This section highlights Indonesia's GMF and China's OBOR initiatives and how both countries share interests.

In the following of his administration, Jokowi had pledged infrastructure as the key agenda. The close relation between Beijing and Jakarta is basically non-

political and more economic pragmatic under Jokowi. It does not involve too much contradictory regarding to the gaining tensions in Natuna Islands. Jakarta's interest to take more effective step relies to China-led economic initiatives. The momentum of economic raising power, China, wished to meet Indonesian infrastructure development program. There are two economic initiatives led by China intersect with Indonesian infrastructure drive.

First, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) which particular to Jokowi infrastructure priority. Even though Beijing has been Jakarta largest trade partner, in this matter, Jokowi is expecting 'more concrete outcomes' from China. He also asked China to be more involved in infrastructure projects and called more investment into Indonesia. Jokowi has taken infrastructure as the main discussion with Chinese officials in the first round during the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Beijing in November 2014 (Parameswaran, The Diplomat, 2016).

Until 2017 AIIB has approved to finance three Indonesian projects; Dam Operational Improvement and Safety Project Phase II including to increase the safety and the functionality of the 63 short-listed prioritized large dams/reservoir and to develop and mainstream the regulatory and administrative arrangements for dam and reservoir management and safety that are more sustainable. Regional Infrastructure Development Fund Project covering urban transport, urban water supply and sanitation, drainage, flood and hazard risk, solid waste management, and slum upgrading and affordable housing. Last, National Slum Upgrading Project covering institutional and policy development, integrated planning support and capability building for local government and communities, urban infrastructure and services in selected cities, implementation support and technical assistance, and contingency for disaster response (AIIB, 2017). AIIB has been reported to fund \$216 million to finance development of slum areas and \$100 million for regional infrastructure development. The operation and maintenance of dams will cost \$300 million, whereas the projects of the toll road and power plant construction will cost \$7.5 billion and \$1.8 billion (Ibnu, 2017).

Second, China's One Belt One Road (OBOR) is aimed to connect Asia, Europe and Africa in term of economic which inspired from the Silk Road Spirit of 'peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning and mutual benefit'. This represents the historic and cultural heritage by all nations around the globe. The initiative is designed to be open for cooperation followed by market operation and international norms. The OBOR encompasses two components; the Maritime Silk Road initiatives (MSRI) and the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) announced in 2013. The Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) focuses on bringing together China, Central Asia, Russia, and Europe (the Baltic); linking China with the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea through Central Asia and West Asia; and connecting China with Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean (The State Council of The People's Republic of China, 2015).

During the speech in Indonesia on October 2013, President Xi Jinping proposed the idea of MSRI start from the Fuzhou going through Southeast Asia pass South China Sea, and then Malacca Strait, Indian Ocean and Mediterranean, end in Europe. The MSRI is planned to facilitate both *soft* and *hard* infrastructure (Blanchard & Flint, 2017). This is automatically intersecting with Indonesia's current maritime connectivity ambition in building sea toll and to connect entire country region. Additionally, China has always been the biggest Indonesia's trading partner.

Hence, Jakarta and Beijing could share the common ground in enhancing economic revolution throughout OBOR. Until May 2017 there are six projects signed into OBOR; Commercial Office, Hotel and Shopping Mall covers Hospitality & Tourism, Property Development, Infrastructure Project covers Ports, Oil and Gas Block Project covers Oil & Gas sector, Jet Engine Power Generator covers power plant sector, Clean Eco Fuel covers CleanTech sector, and Waste Treatment Improving Carbon Efficiency covers CleanTech and Waste Treatment sector (Belt and Road, 2017).

Throughout the expansion of market and improvement of infrastructure, Jokowi's economic diplomacy could elaborate the OBOR initiatives. Syailendra stated that the maritime vision and China's Silk Road ambition is momentum for Indonesia to move on proven by keen response of Indonesian Navy as well as Indonesian

diplomats (Syailendra, 2017). This asides Indonesia-China relation to be more stable even after the tensions in Natuna Islands erupted in 2016. In term of maritime security both countries may have slightly different approach, however both leaders seem akin to lay down the heat and focused more on developing maritime economy. In the end of 2016 perceived that Jakarta and Beijing enhance business activities and people to people contacts. Moreover, in January 20 2017 Indonesian Consulate held a symposium of “Reflections of 2016 and Projections of 2017: Bilateral Relations Indonesia-China” at China Hotel, Guang Zhou, Guang Dong. The agenda was designed to sort out, identify and evaluate many achievements between Indonesia and China in the year of 2016 particularly in the economic, socio-cultural sector (News GD.com, 2017).

In the very timely period, Indonesia and China could work better and leave out hard feelings regarding to incidents in Natuna Islands. This is particularly because Jokowi attempts to emphasize that Indonesia is non claimant state and the neutral stance is always be substantial for Indonesian foreign policy. Sambhi stated that Jokowi maintains the balance action toward both countries so it would not hinder the investment inflows to Indonesia. Significantly, this is also because of the cooperation is two ways agenda whereas “China needs Indonesia as much as the other way around” (Jennings, 2016).

Finally, it is essential to underline Indonesia-China economic relations based on shared interests. Both countries are proactively keen to participate to each of those nation’s initiatives. Regarding to Jokowi’s businessman attitude, it is not impossible to technically separate Indonesia-China tensions in Natuna Islands, and lay extra attention in building stronger strategic cooperation which may benefit Indonesia.

4.4 Conclusion

The main point of this chapter is to gain understanding in how is the current administration articulating national interest based on the GMF vision. Primary idea lies in utilizing current situation to achieve national gains. There are several changes in national, regional, and global geopolitics that Indonesia needs to adapt. GMF is aimed to take advantage out of the changes. It is obviously clear that in gaining economic benefits, national leader is applying flexible approach and put aside the tensions in Natuna Islands. Jokowi is adopting this strategy to be focused on achieving national interest to construct national identity.

First, Economic Diplomacy has been formulated to emphasize Jokowi's economic initiatives. He defined that what hampered economic development in Indonesia is lack of connectivity. Significantly, it is also confined in the GMF pillar of maritime connectivity given that Indonesian territory is separated by seas. Besides, national asset protection also substantial to avoid leaks. On top of all, economic diplomacy is aimed to move from consumption to production.

Second, the finding highlighted new pattern in Jokowi's leadership in articulating national interest in front of the outside world; pragmatic, simple, and straight forward. This point determines how Jokowi communicate to all entities and world leaders which later affecting Indonesia foreign affairs.

Third, it also underlined Indonesia-China growing relation, even though it is not a new partnership, it moves significantly towards comprehensive strategic cooperation partnership. China is the one of the biggest contributors for FDI inflow to Indonesia and also trade partner. However, Indonesia-China new partnership is particularly based on shared-interest in connectivity mobilization.

CHAPTER 5

MEDIATING ROLE AMONG SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTANTS

This part of the finding is very important to picture Indonesian identity and idea in committing to maintain international peace and stability. Aside of articulating national interest, Indonesia have to be vigilant due to the escalating tensions among South China Sea disputants. There are a lot to consider and guarantee for being a mediator in the middle of unpredictable world. Joko Widodo's administration is being tested in this matter, looking by world dynamic from Duterte's new agenda in drugs killing idea to Trump "America First" agenda. While on the other side, in dealing with China's rise in the modern period. This chapter would describe Indonesian status, efforts, and result to be a mediator in South China Sea dispute settlement in formal and informal approach.

Mediating role is not a new concept for Indonesian Foreign Policy. "Free and Active" foreign policy covers the doctrine of being aware and active in world peace and stability. There are four sections in this chapter to gain comprehensive understanding of Indonesian mediating role conceptually and practically. In regard to South China Sea disputes, the commitment has been proven by peacekeeping engagement through times. First, Indonesia holds the long-standing conception and identity of mediator in the region. Second, the GMF to understand and apply mediating role in maritime affairs. Third, strategies adoption from the GMF in order to complete Indonesian mediating role in South China Sea disputes. Last, Joko Widodo's understanding in perceiving mediating role as part of Indonesian culture and identity.

5.1 Indonesian Resilient Image of Mediating Role

Indonesia has been active as a contributor to regional security since the Cold War. In 1948 Vice President Mohammad Hatta initiated "Free and Active" foreign policy to articulate Indonesian foreign affairs to guarantee national interests.

The policy was reflected as Indonesia's position in the middle of two major power (East Bloc and West Bloc) as so called as "rowing in between to reefs". However, national interests' fulfillment should have degraded the international security maintenance. Hence, aside from the need of free alignment toward those two superpowers, Indonesia have to be active maintaining world peace.

Social contribution in Indonesian mindset has come from deep-rooted philosophy. Bowen analysis in Javanese constructed indigenous tradition of *gotong royong* which express assist each other without payment. *Gotong* is Javanese word means "several people carrying something together" while *Royong* means lexical item with the same meaning as *Gotong* which has pleasant rhyme combined with *Gotong* (Bowen, 1986, p. 546). Nevertheless, this philosophy has become national idea in expressing kin neighbors and obligation to help even though the articulation may differ from each of tribe and region. This indicates that indigenous manifestation has been carried out to express national behavior in foreign affairs. Hence, there is no doubt that Indonesia has an active character in collective role.

In ASEAN sphere, Indonesia had been taking the de facto leadership in ASEAN, particularly in security matters. Based on its geographical figure, population, and role in the establishment of the association, Jakarta appointed to be the secretariat since 1976 which imply to be a central organ of the association. Djalal, former foreign minister, added that Indonesia holds a natural leadership in ASEAN which its members regard Indonesia as so (Sapiie, 2016). It is important to understand that its role function to maintain unity and stability of the association, especially in reacting to internal and external threats.

Indonesian central role in ASEAN is for instance crucial in contributing peace in regional conflicts. Since 1979s onwards Indonesia has been playing active role in seeking dispute settlement over South China Sea disputes. Until this point, Indonesia remains active to play major role in the region, thus, ASEAN rests as one of the top priorities of Indonesian foreign policy. Regardless the domestic politics, the concern for ASEAN is constant and significant for Indonesia. In ASEAN journey, Indonesia has been mediating numerous conflict and expelling the leadership role in

the region. Alexandra mentioned that in regard to Cambodia-Thailand disputes over Preah Vihear Temple, Indonesia had been allowed by the United Nations Security Council's as a chair of ASEAN to mediate the dispute (Alexandra, 2011).

In the early age of ASEAN, Indonesia had mediated sophisticated conflict in Cambodia in 1978 and territorial conflict of Ambalat stretch of the Celebes Sea over Malaysia in 1979. Mediating method taken as an approach aimed to reaffirm its leadership position in ASEAN (Emmers, 2014, p. 553). Meanwhile, in 1988-1989 Jakarta had been chosen as the host of Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM) designed to discuss the escalated conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia. Indonesian role was a mediator to gain understanding between two countries, which resulted the withdrawal of Vietnam troops in Cambodian territory. As this was known to be the effective method to mediating conflicts among ASEAN countries, JIM approach was re-applied to resolve territorial disputes between Cambodia and Thailand in 2011 (Kompas, 2011).

In the early 1990s, Indonesia launched the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea prioritized the multilateral dialog and enhance a peaceful management of the conflict. In January 1990 an preliminary Workshop was organized in Bali gathered six ASEAN states, then in 1991 another meeting taken place in Bandung brought all ASEAN states, China, "China Taipei", Vietnam, and Laos (Emmers, 2014, p. 552). These dialogues gained and initiated the declaration in the following next year. Consequently, based on the centrality and role, Indonesia has been labelled as 'natural leader' of ASEAN (Sapiie, 2016).

As a conclusion, this sub-chapter captured Indonesian ultimate constructed idea and behavior that shaped Indonesian identity in front of external world. This conception indicates the implementation of Free and Active foreign policy, particularly in playing active role in mediating agenda. Throughout democracy and alterations, Indonesia remains positive in locating conflict resolution mission as top of its foreign policy.

5.2 Global Maritime Fulcrum: Role of Mediator

Indonesia's peacekeeping mission is distinctive compared to the previous administration. Even though Indonesia's leadership in ASEAN remains relevant for Indonesian foreign policy, there are other new significant roles Indonesia has taken in Jokowi leadership. Global Maritime Fulcrum is a new vision which generates and determines Indonesian foreign policy, specifically in maritime affairs in a greater stretch. This is followed by active involvement in maintaining world peace and stability through mediation.

Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) stands for complex maritime affairs including maritime border management. This concern is focused to boost maritime power both internal and external sphere. This is including the preservation of peace and stability regarding to maritime border issues. Accordingly, the following point is closely related with MEF in defense strategy which emphasize as minimum as possible the use of force in the defense scenario.

Furthermore, GMF leads to sovereignty protection based on the peaceful means. Consequently, the focus has been a cornerstone for Ministry of Foreign Affairs in framing foreign policy. In each year, Indonesia has been flexible in expressing GMF into a foreign policy, especially in dealing with border issues and disputes. Starting from 2015, Indonesian foreign policy was directed to resolve border issues diplomatically. In detail, there were four main international affairs attentions addressed; sovereignty protection; Indonesian migrant and migrant worker overseas, economic diplomacy; and increase Indonesia's roles, regionally and globally. Hence, in total, there were 25 meetings in border issues including 9 maritime border meetings, with 6 countries and 16 land border meetings with 3 countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia, 2016).

Meanwhile, in 2016, Indonesia's diplomacy focused to intensify the Rakhine State issues resolution. Indonesia expressed its concern based on "*diplomacy for humanity has been continuously undertaken*" belief. Indonesia's stands for South China Sea disputes has not changed to keep regional stability based

on the respect to UNCLOS 1982. Following the role of honest broker, Indonesia has been active in pushing the implementation and agreement of Code of Conduct between ASEAN and China. As a consequence, on September 2016, “*Hotline of Communications*” was established to respond to maritime emergencies in order the Declaration of Conduct implementation. There were; 20 discussions/meetings for maritime border and 16 discussions/meetings for land border. 20th MoU on Survey and demarcation between Indonesia and Malaysia in land border between North Borneo and Sabah. Finishing the last two unresolved segment land border Indonesia-Timor Leste (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia, 2017).

Indonesian diplomacy range reaches not only in the Pacific but Indian Ocean. Indonesia has been the member of IORA (Indian Ocean Rim Association) since 20 years ago. Foreign Minister Retno in her latest press statement in January 9th 2018 listed two critical steps in intensifying cooperation among countries in the Indian Ocean rim in 2017. First, *Jakarta Concord* aims to optimize common commitment of UNCLOS 1982 as the ultimate norm to maintain peace and stability in the Indian Ocean rim. Second, *IORA Action Plan* determines the IORA cooperation guide in the future time. In this matter, Indonesia will act as whatever is necessary to preserve Indian Ocean rim as a peaceful area and establish the sense of regionalism. Additionally, Indonesian diplomacy in 2017 was intensified in order for United Nations Security Council non-permanent member for 2019-2020 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia, 2018).

The diplomacy in 2018 will prioritize Indonesia’s existence in the global sphere. As it is getting closer to 2019, there is importance for Indonesia to push forward the candidacy to be United Nations Security Council (UNSC) non-permanent member. Besides, Indonesia is conscious that “*partnership must be strengthened to prevent the mighty takes all*” requires to expand the multilateral partnership. Strategic steps taken in 2018 are centered to eight priorities; strengthen the unity and centrality of ASEAN, increase the maintenance effort for world peace and stability through “Partnership with Like Minded Countries”, conduct several international meetings and events, intensify campaign for UNSC candidacy, continue to discuss

and finish border problem, protect Indonesian overseas through “safe travel”, take the opportunities for economic reform through economic integration expansion, and continue eradicate transnational crimes such as IUU fishing, human trafficking, drugs, radicalism and terrorism (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia, 2018).

In line with that, during a panel discussion on the theme of “Efforts to Overcome the gap in Capability in the United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Mission (MPP)” at UN Headquarter in New York on February 14th 2018, Indonesia has received positive feedback from the UN as its innovation value and breakthrough “out of the box”. The report also wrote that UN Peace Mission prove the fact that Indonesia has contributed effectively. Furthermore, Indonesia is currently trying to push strategic industrial potentials at UN Peace Missions in relation with campaigns to be the non-permanent member of UNSC for 2019-2020 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia, 2018)

Indonesian foreign policy from each year from 2015 to 2018, has showed greater concern on international security and defense issues. Aside from the national sovereignty protection, foreign policy also centered to resolve border disputes by peaceful means. This indicates that GMF intended prominently on mediating role. So as putting much concern on endless and sophisticated disputes, for instance South China Sea, GMF also sets up certain strategy in dealing with South China Sea.

5.3 GMF: Mediating Role Strategies to Deal with South China Sea Disputes

Global Maritime Fulcrum represents Indonesia in managing maritime affairs in front of the outside world, nevertheless to consider peace and stability maintenance. It is important to note down that Indonesia is located in the middle of the South China Sea disputes, both geographically and politically. Geographically, Indonesia has intersected marine border with China’s claimed Nine Dash Line, and share maritime borders across narrow straits with other claimant states; Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines. Politically, Indonesia holds de facto leadership in ASEAN, while Indonesia-China relation had been stunned because of the clashes

between Indonesian naval vessels with Chinese poachers in the resource-rich waters around Natuna Islands in 2016. In order to maintain the neutrality, Indonesia has been tested to react neutrally in dealing with the issue. GMF functions as a fundamental in framing official responses to the disputes.

In his speech, President Joko Widodo's reactions toward South China Sea disputes, he emphasized that *"Indonesian future depends on how we manage the sea for the benefit of our people. That is why we launched our Global Maritime Fulcrum as a strategy and policy framework. ...We reject any attempt by any state to control and dominate the sea and turning aid into strategy competition. ...Indonesia is not a party to the dispute, but we have legitimate interest in peace and stability there. That is why we call all parties to exercise, restrain and refrain in taking action that could undermine trust and confidence and put at risk the peace and stability of the region. We need to talk closely to ensure good order at sea, prevent incidents and ensure freedom of navigation. As I said before, Indonesia stand ready to play an active role in finding solution in South China Sea problem. We believe it is time for ASEAN and China to start discussing the element of CoC in the South China Sea."* (Brookings Institution, 2015). It indicates the behavior chosen by current administration leads to neutral stance to guarantee once again the non-disputant status for Indonesia over the disputes. Moreover, it is pretty consistent that Indonesia marks the effort in pushing the CoC agreement and implementation.

Indonesian consistency also shown in the following years, which in 2016 President Jokowi will continue to encourage peaceful settlement of the ongoing South China Sea disputes. He clearly said in his speech that *"Indonesia has continued to be actively involved in promoting the settlement of South China Sea disputes through negotiation and peaceful efforts following the decision of the International Arbitration Court in The Hag on this issue,"*. While Foreign Minister Retno LP. Marsudi reiterated Indonesia's position and consistency in the maintenance of peace and stability in the region. Furthermore, Retno also explained that the ministry's ASEAN Cooperation directorate general had done a meeting with Chinese

authorities generates two critical outputs; the Code of Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUSE) joint statement and guidelines of hotline communication. (Amindoni, 2016).

In 2017, Indonesia had escalated its determination in peacekeeping mission unlimited to the South China Sea, but also on the contemporary issues; radicalism, terrorism, human rights violation, and ethnic cleansing such as what happened in the Myanmar. In her speech in Asia Society in New York, September 25th 2017, Foreign Minister Retno introduction addresses her eventful weeks during the month in attending meetings to deepen and expand bilateral and multilateral meetings. She also mentioned how Indonesia had been attending the high-level week of UN General Assembly in New York. That is important for Indonesia to advance excellent involvement in UN Peacekeeping Mission for Indonesia's campaign to be UNSC non-permanent member (Asia Society, 2017).

Indonesia's mediating role based on the GMF doctrine is sharp also followed with without neglecting close ties toward potential countries. It is obvious that maritime affairs are one vital sector to be addressed, especially in the peace maintenance with neighboring countries. For the South China Sea discourse, Indonesia has responded in a constant standpoint throughout decades, however this time, GMF generates new aftermath regarding to maritime borders which intended to reclaim its maritime state identity.

5.4 Mediating Role in the Current Administration

The current effort to guarantee the implementation of "Free and Active" foreign policy indicates the significance and existence of Indonesian history. It is necessary to mention and believe that historical aspect contributes in forming Indonesian stance and behavior toward the contemporary challenges. Marking the maritime identity and idea such as "*Jalesveva Jayamahe*", Indonesian tradition is significant in realizing and preserving nation's value. For Indonesia, mediating role is not a new behavior especially regarding to Indonesian role in ASEAN.

South China Sea is not the only dispute for Indonesia to be involved in facilitating and bridging disputants. In ASEAN, there are many cases that Indonesia has been active to role as a “big brother” to keep the region away from the use of force. This is shown by the commitment on ZOPFAN declaration (Zone of Peace Freedom, and Neutrality) signed in Kuala Lumpur in November 27th 1971, and interstate peace treaty (TAC/Treaty of Amity and Cooperation) formulated in Bali in February 24th 1976. Peace intervention in ASEAN members happened few times mainly done by President Soeharto, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and similar method has been don't by President Joko Widodo. President Soeharto assigned Foreign Minister Alatas to invite disputed factions in Cambodia to Jakarta, furthermore, Soeharto flew directly to Hanoi to meet Vietnamese leader, Vo Chi Cong and Prime Minister Do Muoi in November 20th 1990. In the later time, President Yudhoyono involved in mediating southern Thailand conflict but perceived as intervention by Thailand which later Indonesia stepped back from the case. However, Indonesia had succeeded to comprise the peace agreement over Philippine government and Moro group (MILF) on July 2012 and implemented by the end of the conflict on March 2014. Continuously, Indonesia remains active and involved in maintaining peace in the region.

In the past couple years, ASEAN has been facing humanitarian crisis in Rakhine State, Myanmar. Even though the conflict in Myanmar is complicated, Indonesia has committed to mediate Myanmar peace (Putranto, 2017). Foreign Minister Retno had visited Myanmar in September 3rd-5th 2017 and suggested 4 formulas to respond Rakhine State conflict. First, Indonesia pushes Myanmar to return the stability and security in Rakhine. Seond, Jakarta asked Myanmar authority to protect each of its people without discrimination. Third, Retno said Indonesia also asked Myanmar to open the access to Rakhine for countries and international organizations, including Indonesia and ASEAN. Lastly, Indonesia also requested Myanmar to implement all suggestions of Rakhine Human Rights Commission, Kofi Annan, out on March 2017 (Suastha, 2017). Following the visit to Myanmar, Retno's visit to Bangladesh was aimed to have a diplomatic meeting with Foreign Minister

Abul Hassan Mahood Ali. Essentially, Indonesia offered any support and help for Bangladesh government in managing the refugee situation in the Myanmar-Bangladesh border (Kardi, 2017). Legitimately, Jokowi continues Indonesian old tradition in contribution and commitment toward intermediary role.

Given that Indonesia located in vast geography, population and vibrant cultures, the country has been experiencing in diversity and tolerance. In this case, recent contribution has given to Afghanistan. It was the second Indonesian president visit after 57 years to Kabul after President Sukarno's visit in 1961. On Monday, January 29th 2018, President Jokowi met the delegates from the Afghan High Peace Council, chaired by Mohammad Karim Khalili. Prior to that, President explained "*They (Afghanistan) hope Indonesia can play a role in mediating conflicts in Afghanistan, so that they can be resolved immediately.*" in Bogor Palace on Tuesday, November 21st. Afghanistan will wait for deeper cooperation with Indonesia because of Indonesian experiences in maintaining interfaith and ethnic harmony which hopefully can be applied in Afghanistan (Pramadiba, 2017). The visit was quite challenging as the few blasts in Kabul days prior to Jokowi's arrival. At least there were 200 people died and 100 were injured because of the hidden bomb in the ambulance. Cabinet Secretary Pramono Anung expressed Jokowi's bravery in his visit to Kabul even the risk could have heightened. He personally mentioned that "*The president has no fear*" (The Jakarta Post, 2018).

From facts above, could be said that Indonesia is conscious to its responsibility in peacekeeping mission. Current government concerns in intermediary role is unlimited to the wider domain than ASEAN. Those are real efforts for peacekeeping mission which also means articulation of Indonesian identity and tradition. First, the image of "big brother: in ASEAN holds the "natural leader" role in the region. second, Indonesia's experiences in maintaining peace and unity in the country shows the ability in preserving the value of unity over diversity. Hence, it is important to note that conserving unity and maintaining peace is a national character rather than a simple tactic. Nonetheless, in the current administration, it looks like a new strategy, but it is actually an old conception.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter initially explains Indonesian mediating role, regionally and globally. The center argument goes to Indonesian old image, culture, and tradition to maintain peace and stability over conflicts. Indonesia has experienced decades of maintaining peace in the country, regarding to the various ethnography and topography. In order to understand deeper to what mediating role concept Indonesia holds to respond to South China Sea disputes, this chapter captured closely to nature, tradition, and identity aspects to implement its intermediary role.

First, the origin of mediating role came from old foreign policy doctrine “Free and Active” which was initiated by first vice president, Mohammad Hatta. The philosophy under this foreign policy is basically to guarantee national interest during the Cold War and preserved till current period. The foreign policy believes in neutrality stance, also the active contributions toward world peace and stability. This is part of the constructed idea that has been continuously implemented in dealing with the external world.

Second, the image and identity is carried by the current maritime doctrine, GMF, in maintaining peace in maritime and border issues. GMF acts contents in mediating role has been demonstrated by border management agendas. Under the GMF, current administration guarantees the national sovereignty protection but also active in peacekeeping mission showed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs primary agendas and approaches. In spite of being aggressive in protecting marine resources and maritime borders, Indonesia committed to peaceful means; meeting; dialogues; and agreement.

Third, Indonesia’s strategies to deal with South China Sea disputes is rather constant throughout administrations. In managing South China Sea tensions, Indonesia has been active to push the ratification and implementation of CoC between ASEAN country members and China. This is the continuance of mediating role that Indonesia has been playing since the Suharto’s terrain. Nonetheless, GMF is

sharp to the point that Indonesia needs to secure its marine resources and build its maritime power in order to reclaim the maritime state idea and identity.

Last, Jokowi's administration signals new active approach in mediating role. It is rather expanded and unlimited to other disputes and conflicts. For instance; Indonesia has been active to mediate and assist the Myanmar government to finish the human rights violation in the Rakhine State. At the same time, Indonesia also asked Bangladesh government to manage support the refugees who flee across the border. In this case, Indonesia offered help for people in the Rakhine State and Myanmar government anytime needed. In Afghanistan crisis, Indonesia has approached the government through president visit on January 2018. This visit marked the second official visit after 57 years during president Sukarno's administration. President Jokowi offered Afghanistan in the peace maintenance because President Khalili believes that Indonesia has experienced in maintaining peace and tolerance in a long period.

As a conclusion, the mediating role that Indonesia has playing, either in the region or global, is a constructed idea and identity which cultivated as a culture and tradition in its foreign affairs. Its articulation could be different from one to another administration, however, those explicit agendas are derived from the basic idea of "Free and Active" foreign policy. Factors that differ the form of the policy is the intensity from each administration, which in the current administration is centered on maritime affairs. Overall, Indonesian mediating role has been believed as continuation of Indonesia's tradition and culture, also as the perseverance of peaceful country which active in maintaining global stability. Regarding to the solution on South China Sea dispute, Indonesia could not guarantee it will be resolved in certain period without the strong intention from the disputants to solve the dispute in peaceful means. Besides, it is tough for Indonesia to predict where the dispute will lead, regarding to the unpredictable and uncertain global politics.

CHAPTER 6

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

6.1 Introduction

Based on collected data and information in the previous chapters, this last chapter aims to generate comprehensive analysis of the study. Coherently, in the first chapter, author has been outlining and formulating research question which is ‘how has Indonesian “Free and Active” foreign policy has helped managed the tensions in South China Sea disputes?’. Whereby the main objective is to examine Joko Widodo’s implementation of “Free and Active” foreign policy in regard to avoid confrontation in Natuna Islands by utilization of Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF). In this case, the GMF stands for a case study as it is adopted by President Joko Widodo in his administration.

Theoretical framework has been formed by the existence and preservation of neutrality as a national value. It is essential to understand Indonesian long-standing “Free and Active” doctrine in determining state behavior to its foreign affairs, nevertheless in realizing GMF. Thereby, the case would be tested by Strategic Culture concept. This concept relevancy relies under the constructivism theory on security matters. Author found there was a loophole from previous studies in capturing Indonesian value, idea, and identity as a neutral state. Thus, from early understandings of Strategic Culture, this study utilized centered description of Strategic Culture by Lantis in classifying state strategy by sources and keepers. Moreover, to gain further notion based on the case, author adopted Booth’s emphasizes on national leader as important agent to policy-making process.

Throughout that framework, author has outlined three variables to be synthesized in this chapter. Three findings would show the strong relation of Indonesian behavior as an expression of national idea and identity. Each of findings contains of capacity in explaining national and personal (leader) approach in

articulating national identity preservation. The following section will resume each variable collected in Chapter 3, 4, and 5 later to be analyzed.

6.2 Joko Widodo's Attempt to Protect Indonesian Sovereignty

The first finding, as written in the Chapter 3, illustrates the relation between Jokowi's protectionism in order to establish Indonesian image of global maritime fulcrum state. First part of the variable highlighted Jokowi's preferable approach in international affairs. Openness and flexibility are expelled in the current administration. However, he also realized at the critical level, the need to protect Indonesian sovereignty. Thus, Jokowi also eager to manage comprehensive sovereignty protection namely territory (maritime border) and Indonesian citizens (migrant worker). Important aspect in this concern is including navy and military technology advancement. This study captured that Indonesia's behavior is unlikely to send assertive signal to the outside world. It is rather as a reflection of Indonesian maritime vision. Global Maritime Fulcrum is significant to articulate the spirit of archipelagic state.

Those strategies are the fragmentation of historical and national identity of maritime state without neglecting Indonesia's neutrality doctrine in engaging with other states. The military technology advancement is aimed to pledge the development as individual state rather than sending confronting message to China. It is obvious that Indonesia, currently, is avoiding any possible confrontation with China regarding incidents in Natuna Islands. Additionally, Indonesia's movement in international affairs is to guarantee national neutral stance, this is intensely interrelated with other variables in the Chapter 4 and 5.

6.3 Joko Widodo Reflects Economic Benefits

The finding in Chapter 4 emphasized that economic benefits is crucial to allow Indonesia in building tangible aspects. As a sovereign state, Indonesia needs to reflect its interests to achieve domestic prosperity and build strong power in the international affairs. President Jokowi is utilizing a complex approach in economic field. First, Economic Diplomacy is projected to reform its economy, from the problem-roots for to the aftermath of economic activity. Those are started from infrastructure, to support connectivity as a fundamental aspect in industrial activity. This mission is a consistency to one point of GMF vision which cover both maritime and land connectivity.

Second, interestingly, Jokowi is the only Indonesian president who does not come from any political not military background. However, he has strong sense of business; he is rather pragmatic than normative; straight forward and simple. This could be a new practice in Indonesian governance and as many scholars called as new developmentalism. Lastly, he seeks for any opportunity and potential cooperation with the superpower states; China. He chose to put aside Indonesia-China tensions and move toward beneficial relations.

Overall, in order to build maritime power and also maritime connectivity, Indonesia could not close the possibility to build deeper and stronger relations to other prospective states. Realistically, there is a priority scale at this point to use Indonesian neutrality for its good return. This strategy is believed in all period of Indonesian governance that identity maintenance is useful particularly in economic benefits. Specifically, Indonesia and China relation in shared vision of connectivity helps Indonesia in constructing maritime power.

6.4 Mediating Role among South China Sea Disputants

The rationale behind Indonesian mediating role is the longstanding of “Free and Active” which “active” indicates the functioning involvement in world peace and stability. In dealing with South China Sea disputes, Indonesian involvement is not a new national agenda. Indonesia attempts to maintain the de facto leadership role in ASEAN and express the ASEAN unity in dealing with regional issue. Since 1990s Indonesia had begun to facilitate and host disputants’ dialogues and talks. Legitimately, Indonesia also support the drafting, ratification, and implementation of DoC and CoC. In the meantime, DoC has been approved by each party, however, CoC has not been approved by China.

In understanding Indonesia’s stance toward South China Sea disputes, Indonesia perceives that Indonesia’s affectivity in settling the disputes is limited to avoid tensions and avoiding the use of force. Whereby, settlement could be succeeded if only the disputants could agree in determining territorial border. Consequently, Indonesian intermediary role is one effort to preserve the existence of active peacekeeping mission

in the region. However, this narrow function is assumed as effective as long as there is no arms race and use of force among disputants.

6.5 Conclusion

Based on the comprehensive outcome of the study that has been supported by sufficient data and information in Chapter 3, 4, and 5, this part would provide final conclusion. To review the main research question which is “How has neutral foreign policy helps to avoid tensions between Indonesia and China over the South China Sea disputes?”, the author has drawn final concluding remarks.

Indonesian policies over South China Sea disputes and maritime affairs is projected to maintain status quo in ambiguous way. However, in this context, it is clear that it’s rather a constructed idea and identity than ambiguity. Neutral stance is

one patterned and ideal condition for Indonesia in building foreign relations. Meanwhile in the current administration, President Joko Widodo realization in Global Maritime Fulcrum as national maritime strategy is being tested in this research in regard to Indonesian neutral stance. In order to examine this, the study has initiated three important variables; protecting Indonesian sovereignty, gaining economic benefits, and maintain intermediary role in regard to South China Sea disputes. Those resulted single notion that Global Maritime Fulcrum is a process of Indonesia's identity which support Indonesian neutrality behavior in dealing with South China Sea disputes.



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